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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the circumstances that result in the inability of
third-party interventions to solve civil wars. Previous research has examined the impact of thirdparty interventions on the outcomes of civil wars, the interests of third-party actors in civil wars,
as well as the perceptions of civil war participants on third-party actors. The theory in this paper
asserts that third-party interventions are unsuccessful when the government and leader of at least
one country place the interest of special interest groups ahead of the national interest of their
country. This research uses the war in eastern Ukraine as a case study. This thesis uses
nationalist and veteran groups as the special interest group, and high officials in the presidential
administration of Volodymyr Zelenskiy as the government leaders. The rhetoric of the Zelenskiy
administration in regards to the prospects of instituting peace in eastern Ukraine is examined
from the time span of May 2019 to March 2021. The evidence of this research demonstrates that
the rhetoric administration of Zelenskiy changed from conciliatory and positive, to that of a
combination of positive and negative rhetoric towards peace. These government officials
attempted to appeal to their voting base, as well as to the special interest groups studied. This
contradicting rhetoric creates an environment of confusion in regards to ending wars and
conflicts.
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INTRODUCTION
Civil wars have occurred across a multitude of time periods, and across various cultures.
In Ukraine, for instance, a civil war has continued in the eastern part of the country since April of
2014 (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021a). This conflict has been between Ukrainian separatists and
the Ukrainian government in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021a).
When Petro Poroshenko became the president of Ukraine in 2014, he stated his intent to end
hostilities in the eastern parts of Ukraine (BBC News, 2014a). Poroshenko also campaigned in
his election for the presidency of Ukraine to implement a peace deal in eastern Ukraine
(Brunson, 2019). This peace deal, that Poroshenko created, proposed the implementation of local
elections in the separatist regions of Ukraine as soon as possible, as well as the establishment of
a “buffer zone” on the border between Ukraine and Russia (BBC News, 2014b). Under the
presidency of Poroshenko, Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany agreed to a peace deal, known
as the Minsk-2 Protocol, to end this conflict in eastern Ukraine (BBC News, 2015). All of these
actions at the beginning of the presidential term of Poroshenko demonstrated his initiative and
desire to end the conflict in Ukraine and bring peace to the country.
However, as his presidency continued, Poroshenko did not implement the details of this
agreement, as he wanted there to be a ceasefire implemented prior to him conceding to the
Ukrainian separatists (Goncharenko, 2020). In 2015, he also backtracked on his support of local
elections and decentralized power in Kyiv, where Poroshenko stated that it was an obstacle to the
cease-fire deal that had been reached at the time (VOA News, 2015). The Poroshenko
administration also did not enact a law, which the Ukrainian Parliament passed in 2014, that
granted autonomy to the separatist regions (Goncharenko, 2017). Poroshenko also pursued
1

increasingly nationalist policies within Ukraine, such as permitting the teaching and use of only
the Ukrainian language in all regions of the country, and his dismemberment of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church in order to create another national church that favored his government (Petro,
2019). Poroshenko lost his bid for reelection to the presidency of Ukraine to a political outsider,
Volodymyr Zelenskiy, in April of 2019 (BBC News, 2019a). In response to the election of
Zelenskiy, Poroshenko continued to demonstrate his nationalist tendencies, where he claimed
that the new president could fall under Russian influence (BBC News, 2019a). Why was there a
change in the sentiments of Poroshenko towards the prospects of peace, and the eventual failure
of implementing the Minsk-2 Protocol?
This paper seeks to understand why third-party interventions in civil wars fail, and the
conditions that make them fail. Previous research continues to remain divided over the impact of
third-party interventions in civil wars. Some scholars believe that mediation and unbiased
interventions are successful in ending civil wars, while others assert that biased interventions are
more probable in shortening civil wars. To help resolve this splitting consensus, this paper
examines the conditions that set-up third-party interventions to fail. Scholars on the subject of
military conflicts, such as John Mearsheimer and V.P. Gagnon, where they place the blame of
continuing conflicts upon the elites of national governments (Gagnon, 1994; Mearsheimer,
1990). Mearsheimer asserts that elites of countries “manipulate” the opinions of the public
(Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 41). Gagnon argues that the political elites of countries incite ethnic
conflict, so as to create an external enemy that will increase their domestic power within their
countries (Gagnon, 1994, pp. 132 and 135). Instead, this research views the continuation of
armed conflict through a bottom-up approach.
2

This paper theorizes that third-party interventions fail in resolving civil wars when a
leader of at least one side of a civil war places the interests of one or more interest groups ahead
of national interests. This paper uses a qualitative analysis towards a case study using an actorcentric approach. The results of this research demonstrate how the non-rational and emotional
goals of interest groups hinder the prospects of peace in civil wars. From this research, special
interest groups expressed their emotional interests and reactions against the opposition in a civil
war. This study found that government politicians then attempted to appeal to both their voters,
as well as those in these interest groups. These attempts to appeal to different groups result in
contradictory rhetoric on the prospects of obtaining peace in civil wars. Such contradictory
rhetoric creates confusion for the opposition in an anarchic international system, where there are
already no guarantees to government and nations doing what they espouse.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous literature remains divided on the impact of third-party intervention in civil wars.
Past pieces of literature on this subject has also used different approaches to answering this
debate, and other debates on third-party interventions in civil wars. This literature review
examines the various approaches that previous writers have utilized on the subject of third-party
intervention in civil wars, as well as the various conclusions such authors have drawn upon in
this debate on the impact of third-party intervention in civil wars.
Previous Findings to Question
Past authors on this subject have debated the impact of various forms of third-party
interventions in civil wars. Some studies found that unbiased mediation as a form of intervention
shortens the duration of civil wars, and can result in a peaceful conclusion to civil wars (Regan
and Aydin, 2006; Favretto, 2009). This mediation can prevent a spiraling of military build-up
and hostilities, and can result in both sides to intrastate wars in obtaining their interests (Favretto,
2009). Other authors have concluded that mediation decreases the prospect of violence in
intrastate conflicts (Richani, 2005; Beardsley et al., 2019).
Others have asserted that interventions that sought to restore a civil war country to an
order that existed prior to the conflict either does not impact this peace process, or they lengthen
the time taken to achieve peace and negotiations (Regan, 2002; Richani, 2005; Tudoroiu, 2012;
King, 2001). Some authors, such as Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, found that intervention
on both the sides of the government and of the opposition does not resolve the civil conflict
(2008). They asserted that such balanced intervention results in a stalemate between both civil
war actors (Balch-Lindsay et al, 2008, p. 15). Distrust, negative perceptions of other actors, and
4

unsatisfactory peace agreements also resulted in failed peace negotiations to civil wars (Chaban
et al., 2019; Landwehr, 2019; Tudoroiu, 2012; Walter, 1997).
Another branch of thinking claims that biased intervention increases the chances of
victory of a supported side in a civil war, and increases the chances of a negotiated settlement
(Balch-Lindsay et al, 2008; Regan, 2002). Other articles, such as “The Critical Barrier to Civil
War Settlement,” found that mediation does not lead the two warring parties of intrastate wars to
negotiate treaties, while security support of the opposition actor of civil wars increases the
chances of a war settlement (Walter, 1997, p. 360).
All of these previous findings contradict each other. There remains no overarching
consensus on the impact of third-party interventions on civil wars. With these contradicted
findings in mind, this paper examines civil wars in which third-party interventions have failed,
and analyze the factors behind these failed interventions. In the subsequent section, this paper
examines the various analyses employed in these previous studies. In this next section of the
literature review, this paper also justifies its use of a qualitative analysis.
Quantitative and Non-Actor Approaches
Previous works have focused their analysis on the conditions of civil wars of which thirdparties intervene. Some of these works have analyzed the influence of third-party actors on the
conditions of civil wars (Kydd, 2010; Richani, 2005). These works analyzed how various forms
of third-party interventions, such as biased and non-biased interventions, have impacted civil
wars (Beardsley et al., 2019; Favretto, 2009; Kydd, 2010; Richani, 2005; Regan and Aydin,
2006; Regan, 2002; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008; Walter, 1997). Some of these previous works
focused on the influence of various interventions on the duration of civil wars (Regan and Aydin,
5

2006; Regan, 2002; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008). Some authors, such as Regan and Aydin,
examined the impact of timing of intervention in civil wars, and its impact upon the outcomes of
these wars (2006; Regan, 2002). Other works have used casualties as their dependent variables in
their context approaches (Richani, 2005; Beardsley et al., 2019). Additional authors have
examined whether or not third-party interventions have resulted in lasting negotiated settlements
(Kydd, 2010; Favretto, 2009; Walter, 1997).
Such non-actor approaches demonstrate the impact of the international environment on
the context of civil wars, as well as on the actors of civil wars. Most of these approaches include
quantitative analyses, where scholars can operationalize independent and dependent variables
that do not involve examination of the actors of civil wars. These studies operationalized factors
related to this topic, such as the forms of intervention that third-parties undertake, duration of
conflicts, the degree of success of negotiations, and the costs of interventions (Balch-Lindsay et
al, 2008; Beardsley et al., 2019; Regan and Aydin, 2006; Regan, 2002; Findley and Teo, 2006).
These quantitative analyses also examined multiple civil wars, which fit within their criteria, and
examined the outcomes of these wars against their hypotheses (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008; Regan
and Aydin, 2006; Regan, 2002; Findley and Teo, 2006).
Quantitative analyses allow researchers and readers of such research to examine
complicated and lengthy details of factors into concise numerical values, and data sets.
Quantitative analyses also allow researchers to operationalize and observe factors relevant to
civil wars, such as number of casualties, duration of such wars, and economic impacts of these
wars.
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However, this non-actor approach limits the understanding of the impact of third-party
intervention on civil wars to the circumstances that civil wars will become prolonged or
shortened (Findley and Teo, 2006, p. 828). It does not expand upon the reasons, motivations, and
interests of the third-party actors in intervening in civil wars. These interests impact the decisions
that third-party actors undertake in civil wars, such as the form of intervention in civil wars, and
whether they seek to lengthen or shorten the duration of civil wars.
Quantitative studies also do not examine the details of factors within civil wars that
cannot be operationalized. Factors that are operationalized also leave out important information.
For instance, quantitative studies do not focus on the history of the conflict, and the history of the
actors involved in it. With this focus on the quantifiable factors of third-party interventions on
multiple civil wars, such use of data sets of civil wars has limited the uniqueness of each civil
war case. Each civil war, and third-party intervention in it, includes unique actors, individuals,
and histories. Case studies provide closer examination of such factors of third-party intervention
in civil wars. Previous research on the impact of third-party intervention on civil wars includes
instances of case studies that focused on various aspects of third-party intervention in civil wars
(Chaban et al., 2019; Richani, 2005; Tudoroiu, 2012; King, 2001). This research uses a
qualitative analysis within a case study to examine the impact of third-party intervention on civil
wars.
In the following section, this paper examines two approaches that previous works have
focused on in their analyses: non-actor and actor-centric approaches. This paper also rationalizes
its use of an actor-centric approach.
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Actor-Centric Approaches
This work uses an approach that focuses on the actions and thoughts of the actors of
third-party intervention in civil wars. While context approach works used the actors of civil wars
in their analyses, their prime focus was to understand how third-party interventions impact civil
wars. Rather, actor-centric approaches seek to answer why third-party interventions in civil wars
end in specific ways, and why certain actors engage in various ways. Most previous research that
use actor-centric approaches a qualitative analyses. This is evident, as qualitative analyses permit
scholars to examine non-quantifiable factors, such the thoughts, emotions, and rhetoric of
international actors. Some of these actor-centric works have focused on how the third-party
actors analyzed the context of the civil war (Findley and Teo, 2006; King, 2001). Third-party
actors analyze the structure of the conflict, where they consider the costs of intervention, as well
as the characteristics of other outside third-party actors (Findley and Teo, 2006, pp. 831-832).
Third-party actors also will analyze their interests, and compare them to the conditions of civil
wars, and to the interests of other civil war actors (Findley and Teo, 2006; King, 2001). Such
interests are also analyzed against the provisions of treaties in civil wars and the attempts to end
them (Landwehr, 2019). These third-party actors use these interests to determine whose side and
if they will intervene in civil wars (Findley and Teo, 2006), and how they seek to use this
intervention to advance their own interests (King, 2001).
Another branch of literature on this actor-centered approach includes the perceptions that
actors of civil wars have of one another. Previous research on perceptions of intervention in civil
wars focused on the impacts of the perceptions that the participants of the civil war held of the
third-party actors (Chaban et al., 2019). However, this approach focuses on the populations of
8

civil war participants rather than on interest groups involved. As this paper demonstrates, special
interest groups play a crucial role in perceptions and rhetoric of civil war governments of one
another.
This work combines two of these focuses in its actor-centered approach: third-party
analysis of the context of civil wars, and the perceptions of actors of one another. This
understanding of the context of the civil war expands on the ways the domestic actors of the civil
war view their interests against the various peace agreements, and against various actions of
third-party actors. In regards to the perceptions of civil war actors, this paper examines the
perceptions of participants of the civil war towards each other, and towards third-party actors.
Contribution
This research article expands on this debate, and seeks to understand the reasons and
conditions for failed third-party interventions. Such conditions will not guarantee a failure of
third-party interventions to end civil wars. Rather, they make it more probable and create an
environment of failure. It utilizes a qualitative analysis towards a case study. This paper uses an
actor-centric approach, and focuses on factors, such as special interest groups, that relate to the
actors of the civil war. Unlike the previous qualitative and actor-centric research mentioned in
the literature review, this paper seeks to understand how the actors impact the conditions that setup the failures to third-party interventions in civil wars. In the following section, I detail the
theory of this article, where I attempt to answer the question of the circumstances that result in
failed civil war resolutions. The methods of this research are outlined, and the reasoning behind
these methods is explained. These methods are then tested against the theory, where analysis of
such findings is presented in this research work.
9

THEORY
Third-party interventions fail in resolving civil wars when a leader of at least one side of
a civil war places the interests of one or more interest groups ahead of national interests. These
goals of these interest groups are based on emotion, and are non-rational compared to national
interests of the state/unrecognized state. These interest groups are also ones that are hostile to
peaceful means to ending civil wars.
Scope
This theory is limited to the civil conflicts that remain unresolved. There must also be at
least one civil war actor that possesses one or more interest groups within its society. Such
interest groups can either function in an autocratic or democratic society. In either society,
leaders will attempt to appeal to the interest groups so as to maintain their legitimacy of power,
and popularity. This theory can be used in civil conflicts regardless of the locations of civil
conflicts, and the number of casualties.
While this research examines a case study of an unresolved civil war, this theory is
applicable to most conflict situations. For instance, this theory can be used to explain the causes
of intrastate and interstate conflicts. Leaders of countries that put the interests of the special
interest groups ahead of national interests can result in hasty actions against their counterpart.
This action can then result in a counter-action against the instigated engagement, leading to a
spiral to conflict/war, as well as a frozen conflict.
An example of an intra-state conflict that fits this criterion includes internal conflict in
Ethiopia between its government and the Tigrayans. The prime minister of Ethiopia, Abiy
Ahmed, is a member of the Oromo ethnic group (Negatu and Hudson, 2020). The Oromos are
10

the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, yet have not held the power of the government until 2018
under Ahmed (Reuters Staff, 2020). The Tigrayans are a minority ethnic group in the northern
part of Ethiopia, and have held the power of government from 1991 to 2018 (Reuters Staff,
2020). The Oromos, as well as Ahmed, favor a more centralized government, while other
minority ethnic groups, such as the Tigrayans, fear that a centralized government would impede
on their rights (Negatu and Hudson, 2020). Many have accused the Tigrayans, namely the Tigray
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) of helping armed opposition forces to counter the government
under Ahmed (Negatu and Hudson, 2020). Armed conflict began in early November when the
Ethiopian government accused the TPLF of treason (BBC, 2020e). This conflict continues to
occur and risks becoming a destabilizing force in this region of Africa, where Eritrea is involved
in this conflict as well (Nichols, 2020). This example contains a civil war, a third-party actor, and
at least one interest group, the Oromos.
Assumptions
This theory makes use of several assumptions. Prior to explaining the claims of this
theory, this paper details, and provides reasoning of these theoretical assumptions.
System-level
This research paper, like realist theorists, considers the international system to be in
anarchy. This anarchic assumption asserts that there is no international government that
possesses ruling authority over other states (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 54). In the case of civil wars,
this lack of authority over states translates to a lack of authority to help the states where these
civil wars occur. In the ongoing Libyan civil war, for instance, the UN supports the Government
of National Accord against rebel forces (BBC News, 2020a). Yet, the UN has not been able to
11

enforce the end of this conflict, nor has it been able to exert its authority over third-party actors
in preventing their involvement in the conflict. This absence of overarching authority in the
international system results in conflict-torn states either being left to fend for themselves, or at
the blessing/mercy of other third-party states.
Classifying Actors
This research classifies one portion of the actors in international affairs as individual
leaders of countries. This paper focuses on the government officials of recognized and
unrecognized states. This paper regards un-recognized as armed resistance groups that seek to at
secession. This assumption contrasts with other theorists, such as neorealists, who use states as
their actors, and focus on the response of states to the distribution of capabilities in the
international system (Nye, 1988). Such theorists view anarchy in the international system as the
main factor in the cause of conflict, where they do not examine the impact of individuals on the
actions of states in the system (Pashakhanlou, 2009). While this paper acknowledges the
importance of the anarchic system on the occurrence and duration of conflicts, it emphasizes the
importance of individual leaders in the international system. These leaders of different states
hold various perceptions of the international system, and of other states and individuals.
Moreover, these leaders are the individuals that create a strategy of foreign policy for his/her
country, and implement policies in regards to international affairs. It is these individuals that take
initiative in implementing, or dismembering, diplomatic channels and/or peace agreements. This
research focuses on the leaders of one country, and their reactions to their respective special
interest groups of their country. The reasoning for this approach was to examine the impact that
actors in international affairs have upon the conditions of a civil war that result in a third-party
12

intervention to fail. In the case of this paper, the leaders of the participating countries in a civil
war are a representation of their countries, where their reactions to the demands of special
interest groups in their respective countries operationalizes the conditions of failure in third-party
interventions in civil wars.
Third-party actors are defined as states that are involved in a civil conflict outside of their
respective borders, and attempt to mediate in the civil conflict. Third-party actors can also
provide military, economic, and/or humanitarian aid to the main actors of the civil conflict. The
classification of a third-party actor is detailed in the “Case Study” section of this paper.
Another category of actors in this paper includes the interest group(s) of the participants
in a civil war. This paper defines interest groups as organized assemblies of individuals that seek
to influence domestic and foreign policies of their state/unrecognized state (Ambrosio, 2002, p.
2). They attempt to influence these policies using peaceful or non-peaceful means in expressing
their opinions towards issues their leaders undertake. Interest groups attempt to sway
government officials to pursue platforms that enhance their interests (Naoi and Krauss, 2009, p.
875). Interest groups also are more concerned over certain issues compared to average citizens
since they represent a specified group of constituents (Flöthe, 2020, p. 528). This paper focuses
on the interest groups which are concerned over the peace prospects in civil wars, and are at odds
with solving these wars in a peaceful and quick manner.
This research does not focus on the leaders of the third-party interventionists, nor does it
examine the dyadic relationship between the leaders of both sides of a civil conflict. A focus on
the leaders of third-party interventionists would examine the impact of third-party actors on civil
wars. Rather, this research seeks to concentrate on the conditions that result in a third-party
13

intervention to fail in a civil war. The study of the influence of the leaders belonging to the
participating countries of this civil war are a more direct means to operationalize the conditions
that result in this failure of interventions. Moreover, this research examines the influence of
special interest groups on the conditions of a civil war, meaning the actions or words of the
leaders of the countries involved in the civil war. Thus, an examination of the dyadic relationship
between the leaders of two countries would veer away from the purpose of this study and the
theory outlined earlier.
Behavior of Actors
This paper assumes that the interest groups of a civil war state/unrecognized state are
non-rational actors. This paper defines non-rational behavior as actors not using cost-benefit
analysis in favor of the national interest of their country. This paper defines national interests as
the goal of achieving a peaceful conclusion to a civil war as soon as possible. Rather, these
interest groups pursue their own special interests (Naoi and Krauss, 2009, p. 875). These
interests can be emotional in thinking. For instance, the Cuban-American interest group in the
U.S. possesses the interest in continuing an economic embargo upon Cuba (Rubenzer, 2011, p.
107). While it may be more rational of the U.S. to pursue actions of cooperation with Cuba,
especially after the death of Fidel Castro, Cuban-Americans continue to pressure American
policymakers to restrain Cuba. Thus, emotional thinking to international affairs is evident among
interest groups. Emotions are subjective to each actor, where different cultures and histories of
states and individuals impact their outlook of the world (Crawford, 2000, p. 125). Relationships
between actors also classified as emotions, where certain relationships create distinct emotions
between actors (Crawford, 2000, p. 125). In this paper, I focus the scope of negative emotions to
14

be anger, fear, and resentment. This paper focuses on the emotions of anger, fear, and
resentment, as these emotions are responses to the actions the opposition side, and the third-party
interventionist in a civil war. Thus, these three emotions are studied in this paper, so as to
understand the thoughts and interests of special interest groups towards the actions of the
different participants in a civil war. This reasoning in using these three emotions is similar to the
explanation of Roger Petersen that the emotions of anger and resentment are a form of
“backlash” to the actions of something or someone (Petersen, 2020, p. 611).
Anger can be defined as an emotional response to a “demeaning offense,” where an actor
will blame others (Pearlman, 2013, p. 392). The emotion of anger can lead to an actor engaging
in risky behaviors, and in overly optimistic analyses (Pearlman, 2013, p. 392). Anger also leads
an actor to punish the individual it has blamed (Petersen, 2020, p. 611). Fear is defined as a
response to concerns over one’s safety and security (Petersen, 2002, p. 19). The emotion of fear
results in an actor undertaking a pessimistic analysis of a situation (Lerner and Keltner, 2001, p.
147). Actors that exhibit this emotion attempt to avoid uncertain situations and decisions (Lerner
and Keltner, 2001, p. 149). An increase in fear also tends to result in increased pessimism of
future events (Lerner and Keltner, 2001, p. 150). Resentment is defined as a feeling of oneself
being in an undeserving position (Petersen, 2002, p. 40). The emotion of resentment influences
the resentful actor to attempt to alter their undeserving position, and return to a previous position
that they perceive as better and in more beneficial to them (Petersen, 2020, p. 611). Due to this
perception that one’s side/group should be above others in a “status hierarchy” (Petersen, 2020,
p. 611), this paper asserts that resentment is also a feeling that other sides/groups that the
resentful side perceives as being above them also are in an undeserving position.
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Other theorists state that international actors use rational thinking to engage war with
another actor (Fearon, 1995). Such rational reasoning can include a distortion of information of
the adversary, and the distrust actors hold of their adversaries in committing to peace (Fearon,
1995, p. 381). This distortion of information results in states to pursue war, without knowledge
that war against a certain actor would result in more costs than benefits (Fearon, 1995, p. 388).
Moreover, this rationalist reasoning of war asserts that states tend to prefer negotiated
settlements to the damaging costs of war and armed conflict (Fearon, 1995, p. 409).
However, this rationalist explanation does not explain the continuation or outbreaks of
armed conflicts when actors possess accurate information on their adversary, and when thirdparty actors guarantee commitments to peace. For instance, the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh continued in the year 2020 despite past
mediation efforts, and attempts of third-party actors to deescalate the conflict (Global Conflict
Tracker, 2021b). The rationalist assumption of actors does not explain why Armenia and
Azerbaijan continued to risk the lives of thousands of soldiers and civilians of both populations
(Simmons, 2020). This rational assumption of actors in international relations also does not
explain why Azerbaijan refused the concession offers of Armenia (Ward, 2020), and expend
their reputations in the international arena, such as with the American Red Cross (Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, 2020). Azerbaijan also risked the prospect of this conflict becoming a
regional war with its continued fight against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (BBC News,
2020d). In the perspective of actors being rational, it does not maintain Azerbaijan in this
conflict, where this fighting would result in greater costs than benefits.
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This research paper also assumes that leaders in international affairs behave in a rational
manner. Actors, in this case individual leaders, tend to pursue the national interests of their
state/non-recognized states. This assumption of behavior is in line with most liberal and realist
theorists who contend that states and individuals are rational actors, who seek to interact in
international affairs based on cost-benefit analyses. It is the leaders that appeal to the selfinterests of the special interest groups that oppose peace, rather than focusing on the national
interests of their states/non-recognized states, which leads to non-rational outcomes, and an
increase in the possibility of continuing a civil conflict. These leaders respond to these interest
groups, so that they may obtain their support to gain, or maintain their political power (Schultz,
1999). Interest groups possess the power to assist or hinder the prospects of power among
political leaders (Naoi and Krauss, 2009, p. 875). At times, leaders will listen to interest groups
over voting citizens, as these groups can provide political leaders with more valuable information
on policies (Naoi and Krauss, 2009, p. 876). Thus, interest groups utilize their influence in
domestic politics upon political leaders to institute less concessionary measures than the leader
would otherwise pursue in ending the conflict. These less concessionary measures advance the
interests of these special interest groups, not those of the state.
Claims
This paper makes multiple claims on the existence of negative emotions of the public in
at least one of the sides of a civil war results in third-party interventions failing to resolve civil
wars. The first of these claims asserts that anger of one or more interest group towards one side
of a civil war increases the prospect of continued conflict. History of the conflict and of the
rivalry between the two sides of the civil war impacts whether or not anger is felt towards a rival.
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In most civil wars, anger is felt towards at least one side of the conflict. For instance, Armenia
and Azerbaijan accused one another of targeting civilians during their conflict over NagornoKarabakh in the year 2020 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2020). These accusations and
anger over them resulted in one retaliation attack after another, resulting in the conflict to
become prolonged (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2020). Moreover, one interest group in
Armenia, the veterans of the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia during the 1990s, demanded
that Armenia not concede any land in Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan (International Crisis
Group, 2017). This hostile emotion towards Azerbaijan among veterans of the war in the 1990s
was due to the direct involvement of these veterans in this conflict.
This paper also claims that resentment of interest groups, of one side of a civil war,
towards portions of a peace agreement and/or cease-fire agreement hinders the prospects of
third-parties resolving a civil conflict. Interest groups may feel that certain parts of a peace
settlement are non-negotiable, resulting in heightened emotions and tensions towards other actors
who may attempt to change these portions of agreements. These interest groups may take offence
to specific parts of an agreement. As mentioned previously, this resentment, of which the special
interest groups feel that they are in an underserving position, where they attempt to reverse an
action to return to a condition that was more beneficial to them (Petersen, 2020, p. 611). Thus,
this attempt to change the position of one’s side indicates that special interest groups, who are
resentful towards peace agreements, believe that such agreements favor another side in an
undeserving way more than theirs. For instance, nationalist groups within Azerbaijan expressed
their disdain for the previous peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, known as the
“Basic Principles” (Bryza, 2020). This agreement sought to return the Armenian-occupied
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territories to Azerbaijan, and to provide Nagorno-Karabakh with a “temporary legal status”
(Bryza, 2020). However, these nationalist interest groups sought to have Armenia withdraw all
of its troops out of Nagorno-Karabakh, where it viewed this cease-fire agreement as a concession
to this goal (Bryza, 2020). Thus, these interest groups of Azerbaijan possessed resentment
towards the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in an emotional disdain and
response towards this peace agreement.
This paper makes a third claim, which asserts that resentment among interest groups
towards the support that the opposition receives in a civil war decreases the chances of such
conflict being resolved. These interest groups feel that the opposite side of the civil war does not
deserve preferential treatment compared to them. This argument is similar to that of Tudoroiu,
who claimed that the fear of Russians among Moldovans contributed to the conflict in
Transnistria to become frozen (2012). However, unlike the argument of Tudoroiu, this paper
focuses on the emotion of resentment towards third-party support of the opposition of a civil war.
The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh provides an example of this claim, where groups of
Azerbaijanis felt that Russia favored Armenian interests over theirs (Gonca, 2016). This
resentment made the prospects of peace more difficult, as Azerbaijan did not cooperate with the
Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) and Minsk Group (Gonca, 2016).
The fourth claim of this paper asserts that when interest groups fear that their side will
not receive third-party help in resolving a civil conflict hinders the prospect of third-parties
resolving a conflict. These interest groups fear that the opposition group of the civil war will take
advantage of this lack of third-party support. This claim is similar to that of Walter, where she
claims that increased guarantee of outside protection and enforcement increases the prospect of
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peace in a civil war (Walter, 1997). However, this paper seeks to focus on how the emotion of
fear towards the lack of outside protection impacts the ceasing of a civil war. The case of the
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh provides an example of this fear in absence of third-party
protection prevents civil conflicts in becoming resolved. Residents in Azerbaijan claimed that
OSCE, and others in the international community did not enforce UN resolutions and other past
agreements over the conflict (Bagirova and Hovhannisyan, 2020). With this fear of lack of
enforcement of past agreements, and of the union of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, the
population of Azerbaijan sought to continue to engage in conflict with Armenia (Bagirova and
Hovhannisyan, 2020).
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RESEARCH DESIGN
Case Study
This paper has chosen the conflict of Ukraine in the Donbass region as its case study.
Crowds in Ukraine protested the choice of the president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, to not
further integrate into the EU (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021a). These protests led to Yanukovych
to leave Ukraine in early 2014 (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021a). Russian troops then invaded
and annexed the Crimea peninsula of Ukraine in the following month, supposedly to defend
ethnic Russians in the area. (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021a). In May of 2014, separatists in the
regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, who favored closer ties to Russia, made a declaration of their
independence from Ukraine, setting off a conflict against the Ukrainian government that
continues today (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021a). Experts point to the perceived threat of EU
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Russia and/or the Russian government using
this conflict as a diversion from its domestic politics reasons for the involvement of Russia in
Ukraine (Masters, 2020). The sides of this civil war include the Ukrainian government against
the pro-Russian separatists of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Global Conflict Tracker,
2021a). In February 2015, France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia issued a cease-fire agreement,
known as the Minsk Accords (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021a). This agreement included the
withdrawal of heavy weapons in the Donbass region, the pursuit of local elections in the region,
the release of hostages, and the delivery of humanitarian aid (BBC News, 2015). This agreement,
however, failed to resolve the conflict between the Ukrainian government and the separatists.
Russia seems to continue to provide the separatist groups with military weapons and military
support (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021a). Beginning in 2016, NATO forces began to move
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battalions along countries that border Ukraine and Russia, such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021a). U.S. military forces are included in these NATO
forces. The U.S. has also pressured Russia to cease its support of the Ukrainian separatists, and
has provided the Ukrainian government forces with military equipment, and military funding
(Global Conflict Tracker, 2021a).
The Ukrainian conflict provides a case of a civil conflict that remains unresolved amid
third-party intervention. While there are multiple outside countries that are involved in this civil
war, this paper identifies Germany as the third-party actor, where this country acts as the
mediator between the two sides of the civil war. The negotiations and creation of the Minsk-2
Protocol demonstrated an attempt of Germany to mediate (Goncharenko, 2020). The leaders of
Germany and France were the ones to mediate and hold negotiations over this agreement
between Russia and Ukraine (Goncharenko, 2020). This paper does not identify France as the
main third-party, as its military and economic powers are weaker relative to those of Germany
(Speck, 2015). This paper also does not identify Russia, and the U.S., as third-party countries, as
both are biased and support opposite sides to this civil war (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021a).
Thus, this study defines a third-party country as an outside country of a war, and one that seeks
to mediate and implement steps to bring peace to the end of a civil war.
Moreover, this case study includes special interest groups which are hostile to peace with
the opposition. These special interest groups, Ukrainian nationalists and veterans, possess
influence over domestic and foreign policies in Ukraine, where they protest and use acts of
violence to demonstrate their views (Brunson, 2019). Members and sympathizers of these
nationalist and far-right groups are prominent in the government bureaucracy of Ukraine
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(Brunson, 2019), meaning that they possess significant influence within the government. Such
groups include, but are not limited to the Azov movement, and Svoboda (Brunson, 2019).
Testing the Theory
This paper examines the negative emotions, anger, fear, and resentment, among the
special interest groups of Ukraine, and their impact on government officials and the failure of
third-party intervention in resolving this civil war. A chronology, from the time period of May
2019 to March 2021, of these emotions and their impact on government officials is constructed.
The Ukrainian population, rather than the population of the separatists in the Donbass region was
focused on in this paper, due to the greater amount of data available on the Ukrainian public.
Moreover, this data of the Ukrainian public is more accurate than that of the separatists, as there
is a lack of oversight in these regions to ensure that such data is as accurate as possible.
Separatist and Russian-backed groups in the Donbass region are able to manipulate such data
with this absence in non-partial oversight. A qualitative analysis is used to test this theory within
this case study, where such an analysis provides more insight into the rhetoric, and opinions of
the interest group within Ukrainian, and the head of state of Ukraine.
Independent Variable
The rhetoric of the Ukrainian nationalists and the occurrence of nationalist/veteranparticipated protests is used as the independent variables of this study. Protests are one of the
most effective methods for groups and special interest groups to demand a change in policy(ies)
from their governments. This paper also examines the timing of the rhetoric of these protests.
This timing permits the examination of the impact of the protests on the rhetoric of the
government officials. An examination of the rhetoric and of the occurrence of protests allows
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this study to understand the perceptions that these nationalists hold towards the opposition side
of the civil war, as well as towards peace agreements. This study also observes picket signs at
these protests to examine the rhetoric and emotions exhibited at these protests. These
independent variables also permits the understanding of the emotional perceptions of Ukrainian
nationalists towards Russian intervention, and allied third-party support to Ukraine. This study
utilizes the emotions of anger, fear, and resentment as defined earlier in this paper. In order to
examine these emotions, this paper observes the demands made at these protests, as stated
through newspapers and channels. This paper examines the anger of the special interest groups in
this case study, to see if the rhetoric of their protests advocated for the punishment and
retribution against the opposition in this civil war (Petersen, 2020, p. 611). This research looks
for rhetoric that demonstrated an uneasiness of one’s security (Petersen, 2002, p. 19). Statements
related to concessions to Russia, and a desire to join Western institutions demonstrates this
rhetoric of fear among the protestors. Rhetoric and demands that show how the protestors stated
unfairness of peace agreements and of alliances compared to the opposition, as well as a
rejection of these agreements and alliances are examined to understand the impact of resentment
among the special interest groups in this study.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of this paper includes the rhetoric of Ukrainian government
officials in the Zelenskiy administration. This rhetoric operationalizes the willingness of such
officials to achieve peace, and why some third-party interventions do not work. Government
officials represent their respective state. The state is the primary actor in the international arena
(Antunes and Camisão, 2018), which makes it important to represent states with their respective
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government officials. Thus, rhetoric coming from government officials, or representatives of
states, makes an impact on the prospects of peace in conflicts, as this rhetoric comes from the
main actor in international affairs. This paper observes whether or not the rhetoric of the
Ukrainian officials was negative or positive towards the prospect of peace in the civil war. This
paper defines positive rhetoric as words and statements that favor compromise with the
Ukrainian separatists, a reach of common interests with the opposition, and the implementation
peace agreements that have been established between both parties. This paper defines negative
rhetoric as words and statements that are unfavorable to these elements in achieving peace. The
rhetoric of these Ukrainian officials demonstrates the shift and variation of their positions of
conciliation to that of hostility and hard-lined. This rhetoric includes transcripts of public
speeches, interviews, and public conversations that address the separatists, peace agreements,
biased third-parties, unbiased third-parties, integration into the West, and the war in eastern
Ukraine.
This paper defines such peace agreements in the context of the Minsk-2 Protocol and its
details. Similar to the Minsk-2 Protocol, the agreements defined in this paper includes attempts
to create a ceasefire in the separatist regions and frontlines, a withdrawal of “heavy weapons,”
the permission of OSCE to monitor the compliance of both sides to withdraw weapons, a
pardoning of those in the separatist regions, the release and return of prisoners of this war, the
holding of local elections in the separatist regions, the reconstruction of “social and economic
links” in the war-torn parts of Ukraine, a return of control of the eastern border of Ukraine to its
government, a pullback of all non-Ukrainian military forces from Ukraine, and constitutional
reform to create a special status for the separatist regions (BBC News, 2015). This study defines
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peace agreements in this civil war as containing one or more of these elements of the Minsk-2
Protocol.
To confirm the theory of this paper, rhetoric of government officials as the dependent
variable demonstrates how the Ukrainian president responded to the demands of the Ukrainian
nationalist groups. The timing of the protests, and of the rhetoric of Ukrainian government
officials, examines how and if these protests created a variation in the type of rhetoric of the
Ukrainian government officials. This study analyzes if there was positive rhetoric prior to these
protests, and if this rhetoric of the Ukrainian government officials became more negative and
hostile to the prospects of peace after protests occurred. This willingness to achieve peace
demonstrates the conditions that results in civil wars failing. Moreover, this relationship and
variation between these protests and the rhetoric of the Ukrainian officials serves as a bottom-up
mechanism, where it demonstrates the impact that the special interest groups have upon the elite
in Ukraine, and the prospects of peace. Thus, the dependent variable of this research examines
the failure of third-party interventions in an indirect manner. The Ukrainian officials studied in
this paper includes Zelenskiy, Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk, Prime Minister Denys
Shmyhal, Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine (or presidential chief of staff) Andriy
Bohdan, and presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak.
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Background of Ukrainian Conflict in 2019
Before moving forward into the findings of this paper, it is necessary to give a brief
background of the conflict in eastern Ukraine in the year 2019 right before the start of the
presidency of Zelenskiy. The conflict in Ukraine seemed to have become stalemated, where
hostilities between the two sides prevented any sort of compromise (Prokip, 2019). This increase
in hostilities included the sinking of a ship that attempted to export coal illegally from the
Donbass region, the abduction and jailing of a young Ukrainian in Russia, and the continuation
of waves of gunfire from both sides of the conflict in eastern Ukraine (Prokip, 2019). With the
election of Zelenskiy to the office of the presidency in Ukraine, there was a hope that the new
president would restart peace talks with the opposition in this war (BBC News, 2019a).
Backgrounds of Ukrainian Officials
It is also necessary to give brief descriptions of the Ukrainian government officials that
this research examines. The purpose in providing these backgrounds is to demonstrate the extent
of each person’s expertise in government affairs, and their past positions and actions regarding
the war in Ukraine.
President of Ukraine: Volodymyr Zelenskiy
Zelenskiy was elected to the office of the presidency in Ukraine in April 2019 (VICE
News, 2019). Many Ukrainians voted for him in hopes that he would reform the government and
halt corruption in Ukraine (BBC News, 2019a). Zelenskiy also promised in his presidential
campaign to end the civil conflict in Ukraine (Karmanau and Charlton, 2019). This was one of
the reasons Zelenskiy, and other politicians in the “Servants of the People Party” were elected to
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national offices (VICE News, 2019). Upon his election in April, Zelenskiy told news reporters
that he sought to negotiate and open up to dialogue with separatists in eastern Ukraine (BBc
News, 2019a). He also asserted his desire to negotiate a ceasefire in this war, and to continue
with the negotiations similar to the previous discussions in Minsk (BBC News, 2019a). These
statements and promises on ending the war in eastern Ukraine show the desire of Zelenskiy to
bring peace in this civil war. Moreover, such promises of peace indicate the political risks if he
does not fulfill such promises to his voters.
Prime Minister of Ukraine: Oleksiy Honcharuk
Honcharuk was appointed as the youngest Prime Minister of Ukraine in August 2019
(Aljazeera, 2019). He possessed little government experience upon his appointment to this
government position, where he practiced law, and directed an EU-supported NGO (Aljazeera,
2019). He was in favor of liberal economic policies and reforms within Ukraine as well
(Aljazeera, 2019). He resigned as Prime Minister six-months later, after an audio recording
revealed him stating his opinion of the lack of economic understanding that he and President
Zelenskiy possessed (RFE/RL, 2020b).
Prime Minister of Ukraine: Denys Shmyhal
Shmyhal was from the city of Lviv in the western part of Ukraine (UNIAN, 2020b). It is
known that regions in western Ukraine tend to be more nationalist in nature and voting (Masters,
2020). Prior to his appointment as the prime minister of Ukraine, Shmyhal served as the deputy
prime minister of Ukraine (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2020a), as well as the “minister for
Communities and Territories Development” (Makarenko, 2020). Before the presidency of
Zelenskiy, Shmyhal was also the “head of the regional administration in the western Ivano-
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Fankivsk region” (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2020a). Shmyhal also worked as a business
executive, including with the company of a billionaire of Ukraine named Rinat Akhmetov
(RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2020a). This background of Shmyhal demonstrates that he
possesses experience within government service, as well as in the business sector.
Ukrainian President Chief of Staff: Andriy Bohdan
Before his appointment as the Ukrainian presidential chief of staff in May 2019
(RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2020e), Bohdan was one of the lawyers that represented Ihor
Kolomoisky in a battle between the Ukrainian government over the Ukrainian lender, PrivatBank
(Zinets, 2020). Kolomoisky is one of the richest individuals in Ukraine and owns the television
channel “1+1” that was connected with Zelenskiy during his acting career (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian
Service, 2020e). Bohdan was also linked to a delegation to Russia in 2013 that stopped the
process for the Ukrainian government to undertake the Association Agreement with the EU
(Radio Svoboda, 2019). This fact shows possible favoritism of Bohdan towards Russia. His main
tasks as the Ukrainian President Chief of Staff were within law enforcement and economic
reforms in the country (Dickinson, 2020a). Zelenskiy fired Bohdan in February 2020, and cited
the inability of Bohdan and Andriy Yermak to cooperate in his administration. (Francis, 2020).
Ukrainian President Chief of Staff: Andriy Yermak
Prior to his appointment as the chief of staff to the Ukrainian president, Andriy Yermak
served as an aide to President Zelenskiy (Kyiv Post, 2020). Yermak worked as a copyright
lawyer and television executive, and has continued a long friendship with Zelenskiy (Kyiv Post,
2020). His duties focused on international affairs (Kyiv Post, 2020). Yermak was the key player
in negotiating two prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and the separatists in the eastern regions
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(Kyiv Post, 2020). This second prisoner exchange occurred in December of 2019, where the
Ukrainian government and Ukrainian separatists swapped 200 imprisoned individuals (Jamieson,
2019). He also took part in the Normandy Format meeting in December 2019, where he
threatened to cut-off the separatist region from the rest of Ukraine unless Russia withdrew its
demands of local elections in these areas (Francis, 2020). In this meeting, Yermak acted the part
of the hardliner and tough negotiator.
May 2019
Zelenskiy
After taking his oath of office to the presidency of Ukraine (President of Ukraine, 2019),
Zelenskiy made a speech to the Ukrainian parliament (Krym.Realii, 2019) (see Appendix A). In
this speech, Zelenskiy asserted his intention to bring back the “lost territories,” which referred to
the separatists regions and Crimea (Krym.Realii, 2019). He stated that these territories belonged
to the country of Ukraine “by right” (Krym.Realii, 2019). Zelenskiy also claimed that the
residents in the separatist regions and Crimea were Ukrainian (Krym.Realii, 2019). He accused
past administrations of the Ukrainian presidency of not making these people feel welcomed and a
part of Ukraine (Krym.Realii, 2019). He assured the public, and other government officials
present, that he would seek to change this hostile outlook towards Ukrainians in these regions
(Krym.Realii, 2019). Such assertions represent a desire of Zelenskiy to reunite his country, and
to accept those in the separatist regions back into the mainstream of Ukrainian society.
In this same month, Zelenskiy visited the front line of the war in eastern Ukraine
(RFE/RL, 2019a). Zelenskiy sought to view the status of the Ukrainian military with this visit,
and talk with soldiers in the area (RFE/RL, 2019a).
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Bohdan
Along with the comments of Zelenskiy in this month, Bohdan stated that the Ukrainian
government would conduct a national referendum to approve future agreements with the Russian
government (UATV, 2019). He continued and asserted that the general Ukrainian society should
be permitted to decide on these future peace agreements with the opposition of this civil war
(UATV, 2019). This statement seems to be optimistic about the prospects of achieving common
interest and agreements to resolve the war in eastern Ukraine with the Russian government. This
rhetoric of Bohdan also demonstrates a commitment towards placing the interests of common
Ukrainian ahead of special interests.
July 2019
Zelenskiy
In In July of 2019 after Zelenskiy asserted positive rhetoric on peace in his first speech in
the Ukrainian parliament as president, Zelenskiy made a visit and speech in Odesa to Ukrainian
sailors and naval personnel (NASH, 2019) (see Appendix B). While Zelenskiy stated that
Ukraine sought a strong navy, as well as international support for such a navy, he proclaimed
that it was unfortunate that Ukrainian sailors had lost their lives while defending their country
(NASH, 2019). He continued, and stated that he sought to return the Ukrainian sailors that served
in this navy to their loved ones at home in future (NASH, 2019). Such statements hint at a desire
for peace in Ukraine, and the end of hostilities between Russia and the Ukrainian separatists.
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September 2019
Zelenskiy
Along with this peaceful rhetoric of Zelenskiy, the Russian and Ukrainian government
conducted a prisoner swap at the start of September 2019 (Nechepurenko and Higgins, 2019).
These released Ukrainian prisoners included sailors that were captured off the coast of Crimea
(Nechepurenko and Higgins, 2019). Zelenskiy stated that this prisoner swap was the beginning to
creating “unblocking dialogue” and putting an end to the war in Ukraine (Nechepurenko and
Higgins, 2019). Zelenskiy also expressed his hope that the peace deal made in 2015 in Minsk,
Belarus could be implemented (Nechepurenko and Higgins, 2019). He insisted that his
administration and government was doing more than talking about peace, and that this prisoner
exchange was proof that the Ukrainian government was achieving results towards the prospects
of peace (Nechepurenko and Higgins, 2019). Zelenskiy asserted that he sought to have Russianoccupied land returned to Ukraine, and the release of other Ukrainian military personnel
(Nechepurenko and Higgins, 2019). These avowals of Zelenskiy indicate his intent to continue
negotiations and discussions with the Russian government in hopes of ending the war in eastern
Ukraine.
In this same month, Zelenskiy spoke at the UN General Assembly in his first speech to
this international institution (PBS NewsHour, 2019a). In this speech, he addressed the war in
eastern Ukraine (PBS NewsHour, 2019a). Zelenskiy asserted that his objectives are to recover
eastern Ukrainian lands, and to create peace in the country (PBS NewsHour, 2019a). The
president of Ukraine also stated that he would not achieve these objectives at the “cost of lives”
of other Ukrainians, and not at the expense of the sovereignty of Ukraine (PBS NewsHour,
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2019a). These statements consist of positive rhetoric in ending the war in Ukraine, and achieving
peace in the country. He appealed to international support for Ukraine in this war, where he
claimed that the war in Ukraine was also the interests of other countries (PBS NewsHour,
2019a). This statement demonstrates the desire of Zelenskiy to gain international support and
allies for the Ukrainian government. However, Zelenskiy also asserted that international
institutions were not perfect and needed reforms (PBS NewsHour, 2019a). He also condemned
the use of weapons as a tactic to resolving disputes between countries and people (PBS
NewsHour, 2019a). Again, this statement consisted of rhetoric that was in favor of peace and
negotiations in ending the war in eastern Ukraine. This rhetoric was also espoused in Zelenskiy
having stated that strong leaders “care about the lives of every person” (PBS NewsHour, 2019a).
He continued, and denounced leaders who talk of peace, yet engage their countries and people in
armed conflicts (PBS NewsHour, 2019a). Zelenskiy stated his wish to create a world that is free
from “anger” and conflict (PBS NewsHour, 2019a).
October 2019
Zelenskiy
Zelenskiy continued with rhetoric in favor of peace, where his government agreed
“provisionally” to permit and conduct elections in the separatist regions of Ukraine (RFE/RL’s
Ukrainian Service, 2019). He stated that the elections in these regions would not be “held at
gunpoint” (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2019). Zelenskiy expressed optimism that these
elections would open up future negotiations with Russia over their support to the separatist
regions (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2019). Under these elections, the separatist regions of
Ukraine would be granted “self-governing status,” where OSCE will preside over such elections
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(RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2019). Zelenskiy asserted that he wanted all Ukrainian citizens to
return to Ukraine (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2019). This agreement of Zelenskiy and his
government to permit elections in eastern Ukraine, as the Steinmeier Formula describes, showed
that Zelenskiy is willing to push forward and initiate peace agreements with Russia and the
Ukrainian separatists (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2019).
There was a continuation of peaceful rhetoric during this month. A few days later after
his first statement on elections in eastern Ukraine, Zelenskiy announced that Ukrainian soldiers
would draw back behind portions of the frontlines, as long as Ukrainian separatists also showed
signs of withdrawing their troops from these areas (BBC News, 2019b). At this point, Ukrainian
military personnel had withdrawn from one town along the frontline of this war (BBC News,
2019b). Zelenskiy also stated that Ukrainian troops would withdraw from the towns of Zolote
and Petrivske the following week (BBC News, 2019b). He also asserted that in order for there to
be elections in the separatist regions, there needed to be a ceasefire, a withdrawal of Russian
military personnel, the permitting of Ukrainian government guards to station at the border
between Russia and Ukraine, the permission of multiple political parties participate in such
elections, and the exchange of the remaining prisoners between Ukraine and Russia (BBC News,
2019b). Such statements demonstrate a positive rhetoric to compromise with the separatists.
Moreover, his support to withdraw Ukrainian troops from the frontlines of this civil war shows
his continuing attempts to initiate peace in this war.
Zelenskiy acted on this peace rhetoric with his agreement to the Steinmeier Formula
(Miller, 2019). The representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the separatist regions, and OSCE also
signed this agreement (Miller, 2019). The Steinmeier Formula, which German Foreign Minister
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Frank-Walter Steinmeier created, advocated for local election in the separatist regions in Ukraine
(Miller, 2019). This agreement also called for the OSCE to supervise the elections in the
separatist regions (Miller, 2019). When he signed the Steinmeier Formula at the beginning of
October 2019, Zelenskiy stated that the Ukrainian government would not permit the local
elections to take place in the separatist regions until Russian troops withdrew from these regions
(Miller , 2019). Yet, his statement on the need to withdraw Russian troops from eastern Ukraine
possesses the potential to be at odds with the interests of the Russian government.
Towards the end of this month, there seems to have been a slight transition in the rhetoric
of Zelenskiy. He visited the town of Zolote later in October (See Appendix C) (TSN, 2019).
While here, he visited locals, and examined the Ukrainian military personnel stationed in the
town (TSN, 2019). Zelenskiy agreed with the statement of one of these military personnel, who
stated that there would be no “disengagement” in Zolote (TSN, 2019). Yet, when talking to some
of the locals in Zolote, he reassured them that the Ukrainian government would withdraw its
military forces from the town (TSN, 2019). Zelenskiy then met with protestors in the town who
were against his withdrawal of Ukrainian military forces (TSN, 2019). He told these protestors
that he was in Zolote to see what the people of the town thought of this proposed withdrawal of
military forces (TSN, 2019). Thus, there seems to be an alteration in the rhetoric of Zelenskiy,
where at times he indicates his desire to keep troops in the town, while at other moments he
signals his intent to withdraw Ukrainian forces. When conversing with the volunteer soldiers and
protestors, Zelenskiy stated that negotiations were needed to end this war, as people and
countries had ended other wars in history (TSN, 2019). He instructed these volunteer soldiers to
put away their weapons to honor the disengagement in Zolote (TSN, 2019). This order of
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Zelenskiy demonstrated rhetoric that was in favor of de-escalation and peace in this war. He
accused the volunteers of believing he was a “goof,” and he asserted that he is not such a person
(TSN, 2019). Speaking to different locals in the town, he asserted the citizens that the Ukrainian
government had released the checkpoint blockers, and that dialogue was necessary between
Ukraine and the other side of this war (TSN, 2019). He also reassured these locals that the
disengagement and withdrawal of troops would occur soon within the area (TSN, 2019). This
statement to the locals expressed the positive rhetoric, and maneuvers of Zelenskiy in ending the
war and compromising with the other side, where he was committed to withdraw Ukrainian
troops and commit to agreements made with the opposition. The withdrawal of these Ukrainian
troops began on October 29 of this year (RFE/RL, 2019b). This visit to Zolote represented one of
the first instances of an alteration of the rhetoric of Zelenskiy, albeit a minute shift.
Bohdan
Around the same time that Zelenskiy made his visit to Zolote, Bohdan participated in an
interview with the news agency, “Ukrainski Pravda” (see Appendix F) (Ukrainski Pravda, 2019).
In this interview, Bohdan discussed his past work with Kolomoskiy, as well as his thoughts on
the implementation of the Steinmeier Formula (Ukrainski Pravda, 2019). He asserted his belief
that the exchange of prisoners between Russia and Ukraine was a step towards cooperation
between the two parties, and that it demonstrated that the Ukrainian government would protect
its citizens and soldiers that had been captured (Ukrainski Pravda, 2019). He also rejected the
assertion that this prisoner exchange placed Ukraine at a disadvantage in the war in Donbass
(Ukrainski Pravda, 2019). These statements contained positive rhetoric, where Bohdan was in
favor of this prisoner exchange that occurred in September of this year. Bohdan continued with
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this rhetoric in favor of pursuing a peaceful end to the war in eastern Ukraine. He asserted that
the signing of the Steinmeier Formula promoted a progression towards peace, where it
demonstrated the intent of the Ukraine government to pursue a peaceful means to end this war
(Ukrainski Pravda, 2019). Bohdan continued, and stated that the actions of the Ukrainian
government towards peace would permit the citizens of Russia to be able to understand that
Ukrainians are not the belligerents in this war (Ukrainski Pravda, 2019). Bohdan asserted his
reasoning that these peace deals permit the Ukrainian government to project its intentions around
the disinformation of the Russian media and leaders (Ukrainski Pravda, 2019). This statement
consisted of rhetoric that was in favor of negotiating peace settlements in this war. Yet, this
statement of Bohdan seems to have been a dig at the Russian government and its media agencies.
Protests
During this time of Zelenskiy negotiating to withdraw troops and his statements on the
need of peace, there were massive demonstrations in the streets of Ukraine against the peaceplan of President Zelenskiy (Karmanau and Charlton, 2019). These protests consisted of far-right
and nationalist groups, where veterans of the Ukrainian military viewed Zelenskiy as unpatriotic
to Ukraine (Karmanau and Charlton, 2019). These protests continued for multiple days,
including on October 14, where about 12,000 participants attended the protests (Shandra, 2019).
This protest on October 14, 2019 was known as the “No to Capitulation” protest (Shandra,
2019). Many of these veterans and nationalists chanted nationalist slogans, and demanded that
the troops from Eastern Ukraine not fall back (Karmanau and Charlton, 2019). These protestors
expressed their fear of Russia pouncing on this troop withdrawal to gain possible territory in
Ukraine (Karmanau and Charlton, 2019). They also did not want President Zelenskiy to permit
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amnesty for the separatists in the eastern part of the country (Karmanau and Charlton, 2019),
which indicates a sense of anger towards the Ukrainian separatists in their actions in this civil
war. One of the protestors stated that it was “unforgivable” to absolve the separatists (Roth,
2019), which expressed the anger of the protestors towards the opposition of the civil war. The
protestors also opposed the implementation of local elections within the separatist regions
(Karmanau and Charlton, 2019). These protests were in opposition to the elements of the
Steinmeier Formula, as this agreement called for local elections in the eastern regions of Ukraine
(Miller, 2019). Thus, this opposition to this element of the Steinmeier Formula can be interpreted
as a sign that they find this agreement to be unfair. Some protestors demonstrated their hope to
prolong the civil war with banners titled, “Peace After Victory” (Karmanau and Charlton, 2019).
They viewed the reunification of the separatist oblasts as unconditional to ending this war. These
protests continued into late October, including in the town of Zolote, which is near the frontlines
of the war in Ukraine (UNIAN, 2019).
November 2019
Honcharuk
In a seminar with Chatham House later part of November, Honcharuk asserted that
Russia occupied the Donbass region of Ukraine (Chatham House, 2019a). He continued and
stated that Russian aggression in Ukraine was a threat to the world and international order
(Chatham House, 2019a). According to Honcharuk, the build-up of military capabilities and
technologies in Russia served as a threat to the “civilized world” (Chatham House, 2019a). These
statements placed blame on Russia and its aggression in Ukraine, and portrayed Russia as the
enemy to the international order. Honcharuk stated his hope that countries in the international
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order would implement sanctions and conduct “coordinated actions” to restore the rule of
international law (Chatham House, 2019a). Further along in this seminar, he stated that the
MH17 plane crash was the fault of the Russian Federation, and stated that those involved in it
must be held accountable (Chatham House, 2019a). This plane crash was shot down over the
eastern region of Ukraine on July 17, 2014 (BBC News, 2020b). An investigation into the crash
found that a Russian Buk missile (BBC News, 2020b). Thus, while Honcharuk may have made a
factual statement in the fault of this plane crash being that of the Russians, such a statement will
create increased tensions between the Russian and Ukrainian governments. This rhetoric was a
shift from the rhetoric of Zelenskiy in October, which was in favor of peace.
A few days later, Honcharuk restated that “Russian aggression” was one of the most
prominent threats to Ukraine achieving forty percent economic growth over a five-year period
(Chatham House, 2019b). He asserted that Russian aggression against Ukraine was a threat and
problem for the “whole civilized world” (Chatham House, 2019b). Honcharuk again stressed that
Russia and its involvement in Ukraine was against international law, and required the support of
the world to resolve such issue (Chatham House, 2019b). He continued and stated that Western
powers, democratic ones in particular, can assist in protecting the “sovereignty and territorial
integrity,” of Ukraine (Chatham House, 2019b). It seems that Honcharuk portrayed Russia as an
enemy of Ukraine and its economic progress. He also seems to have been in favor of support
from Western powers, including the U.S. (Chatham House, 2019b). Again, this rhetoric of
Honcharuk during November 2019 was in contrast with the rhetoric that Zelenskiy made in
October. The timing of the protests in October comes before and relates to the rhetoric of
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Honcharuk in November, which makes it seem that these protests had an influence on this
government official.
December 2019
Zelenskiy
Zelenskiy asserted that his upcoming talk with Putin in December of 2019 was a
“victory,” where he believed that both parties negotiating was an important step to ending this
war (VOA News, 2019). He also stated that he would “not be pushed around” at this meeting
(VOA News, 2019), which demonstrates that Zelenskiy sought to remain to be seen as a strong
figure within his country. This statement could also be seen as an attempt of Zelenskiy to appear
as a defender of Ukraine that would not concede to the opposition, which was an appeal to the
nationalist groups.
Despite this tough rhetoric, and the negative rhetoric towards peace of Honcharuk,
Zelenskiy met with Putin on December 9th in Paris, France (PBS NewsHour, 2019b). Both
leaders also worked with the leaders of Emmanuel Macron, the president of France, and Angela
Merkel, the chancellor of Germany (BBC News, 2019c). The representatives of these four
countries have been classified as the “Normandy format” (BBC News, 2019c). The preconditions
for this meeting were for the militaries of the Ukrainian government to withdraw troops from
three towns along the frontlines, including Zolote, and propose a “special status” to the separatist
regions in Ukraine (BBC News, 2019c). Both sides adhered to this precondition (BBC News,
2019c). Both Zelenskiy and Putin agreed to another prisoner exchange between Ukraine and
Russia (PBS NewsHour, 2019b). These two leaders also agreed to carry-out a ceasefire
agreement that was created in the year 2015 (Higgins, 2019). All of these agreements and
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negotiations achieved demonstrate positive rhetoric and actions on the part of Zelenskiy to
pursue peace in the war in eastern Ukraine. Despite this progress, Zelenskiy stated that he had
sought to have seen more come out of these negotiations (Higgins, 2019). However, Zelenskiy
stated his optimism that these issues would be addressed in future negotiations (Higgins, 2019).
This optimism demonstrates his intentions to continue to negotiate with the opposition actors in
the war in eastern Ukraine. Zelenskiy also asserted his desire to have control of the eastern
border of Ukraine returned back to the Ukrainian government (Higgins, 2019). He asserted his
determination to not permit local and more independent control of the eastern regions of
Ukraine, unless the government of Ukraine regains this border (Higgins, 2019). This assertion of
Zelenskiy to regain the eastern border of Ukraine as a precondition to local elections shows a
possible rift in conducting such elections.
Protests
More protests and demonstrations were present in December of 2019. These protests
were conducted prior to President Zelenskiy meeting with Vladimir Putin, the president of
Russia, in Paris (VOA News, 2019). Thousands attended these protests, including in the capital
city of Kiev (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2019). Some protestors held signs that
demonstrated their support for joining NATO and the EU (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
2019). This demonstrates that these protestors feared of receiving no third-part support (Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2019). Similar to the protests in October of this year, these protestors
believed that any withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Eastern Ukraine is a form of appeasement
to the Russians (VOA News, 2019). Some Ukrainian soldiers expressed their concern over these
military withdrawals as well, where they felt that their colleagues will have risked their lives to
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no benefit of Ukraine (VOA News, 2019). These soldiers were also fearful that the separatists
and Russia will gain territory after this withdrawal of Ukrainian troops (VOA News, 2019).
February 2020
Zelenskiy
At the beginning of the year 2020, Zelenskiy attended the Munich Security Conference in
Germany (UNIAN, 2020a). At this conference, Zelenskiy stated that he sought to permit local
elections within certain parts of the separatist regions in Ukraine (UNIAN, 2020a). However, he
stated that the constitution of Ukraine and democratic procedures must be upheld in these regions
in order for such elections to occur (UNIAN, 2020a). These statements seem to have possessed
elements of positive rhetoric in favor of peace in the war in eastern Ukraine. Yet, Zelenskiy also
asserted that Russia had issued Russian passports in the year 2019 within the separatist regions
(UNIAN, 2020a). This statement and accusation, while factual, will not bode well with the
Russian government. Zelenskiy also stated his opposition to engaging in dialogue with the
leaders of the separatist regions in Ukraine (See Apendix D) (112 Ukraina, 2020). His
justification for this assertion was that these separatists were not recognized under international
laws and standards, and that these separatist leaders do not represent the local populations that
inhabit such areas (112 Ukraina, 2020). Rather, Zelenskiy stated his intent to negotiate with the
“ordinary people” from these separatist regions (112 Ukraina, 2020). This rhetoric seems to not
have been conciliatory towards the leaders and towards the separatist leaders in eastern Ukraine.
It will be difficult for Zelenskiy to end this war with diplomacy if his government is unwilling to
negotiate with the enemies. Thus, while the rhetoric of Zelenskiy seems at first to have been
positive towards peace, there were hints at him becoming more hard-lined at this time. The
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protests in December of 2019 seem to have influenced this alteration in rhetoric, where they had
taken place just less than two months prior to these statements of Zelenskiy.
During the month of February, there was also a rise in military confrontation between the
separatists and the Ukrainian military (BBC News, 2020c). This confrontation occurred near the
town of Zolote (BBC News, 2020c). Zelenskiy stated that this military “flare-up” would not
hinder his administration from continuing to pursue peace (BBC News, 2020c). This assertion
shows the favorable rhetoric Zelenskiy espoused towards bringing the war in eastern Ukraine to
a peaceful conclusion. However, Zelenskiy also put blame upon the separatists for this outbreak
in fighting, where he stated that the separatists cause a “provocation” (BBC News, 2020c). He
also accused these separatists of attempting to destroy the progress to peace in eastern Ukraine
(BBC News, 2020c). These accusations, while possibly factual, will only have harmed relations
between the Ukrainian government and separatists.
Zelenskiy also fired Bohdan during this month, where he stated that Bohdan and Yermak
were unable to cooperate in his administration (Francis, 2020). Some viewed the appointment of
Bohdan as a step away from Ukraine moving towards closer relations with the West, as the
background of Bohdan with Kolomoisky made the chief of staff seem corrupt and unwilling to
implement reforms in Ukraine (Dickinson, 2020a). Other individuals view the firing of Bohdan
as a positive move towards Ukraine becoming a part of the West (Olearchyk, 2020). Future
moves to integrate with the West and its institutions, such as the EU and NATO would clash
with the interests of Russia and its separatists (Masters, 2020).
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Yermak
Following the release of Bohdan from his position as the chief of staff to the president,
Yermak stated that ending the war in eastern Ukraine, and stopping people from dying in this
conflict were his top priorities (Kyiv Post, 2020). This rhetoric was similar to that of the rhetoric
of Zelenskiy, where both called for peace in the separatist part of Ukraine. In this first press
conference, Yermak affirmed that having local election in the eastern part of Ukraine in October
2020 made sense, as this was the same month that Ukraine held local elections across its country
(President of Ukraine, 2020a). He also stated earlier in this press conference that there could be
“compromises during the negotiations” between Ukraine, the separatists, and Russia (RFE/RL,
2020a). However, similar to Zelenskiy, he stated that these elections must be under Ukrainian
laws, and that the eastern borders of Ukraine must be brought back under its jurisdiction
(President of Ukraine, 2020a). He stressed that there would be no compromise on these
preconditions within the eastern regions of Ukraine (President of Ukraine, 2020a).
March 2020
Zelenskiy
After Zelenskiy appointed Yermak as his new presidential chief of staff, he made
multiple changes to his governmental personnel (Temnycky, 2020). This reshuffling of
government positions included the resignation of Honcharuk as the prime minister of Ukraine
(RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2020a). Zelenskiy commented on the changes of governmental
positions, where he stated that new people with new ideas and “hearts” were needed within the
Ukrainian government (Dickinson, 2020b). He also asserted that the evidence of no corruption of
the previous government officials was not sufficient in solving the problems in Ukraine
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(Dickinson, 2020b). Some of these figures will be discussed further in this research. Most of this
new personnel possessed ties to Russia, and to Ukrainian politicians that were favorable to
Russia in the past (Temnycky, 2020). This move to appoint individuals linked to pro-Russian
politicians seemed to be an indicator of Zelenskiy willing to negotiate with the Russian
government.
However, this connection to pro-Russian politicians is no guarantee that these appointed
individuals will implement pro-Russian policies, and be compromising to Russia. This lack of
guarantee of compromise between the opposition of the war in eastern Ukraine could occur, due
to the fact that much of the new officials that Zelenskiy appointed possessed government
experience from past Ukrainian government administrations and presidencies (Dickinson,
2020b). Moreover, one of these appointments included that of Shmyhal, who was from Lviv,
which is a city in western Ukraine (UNIAN, 2020b). Regions in western Ukraine tend to be more
nationalist, and in favor of moving politically closer to the West (Masters, 2020). Thus, this
move to appoint Shmyhal as the prime minister of Ukraine can be interpreted as an attempt of
Zelenskiy to appeal to nationalist sentiments in the country. This recruitment of pro-Russian and
western Ukrainian politicians seems to be an attempt of Zelenskiy to appeal to those in Ukraine
that seek to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and to the nationalist/veteran interest groups.
This employment of these different kinds of government officials may result in a combination of
positive and negative rhetoric in regards to peace prospects in eastern Ukraine.
Shmyhal
Upon his appointment as the prime minister of Ukraine, Shmyhal stated that he was in
favor of providing water supplies to the Crimea peninsula (Nahaylo, 2020). While this statement
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at first seems unrelated to the war in eastern Ukraine, it demonstrates a positive attitude towards
lessening tensions between Russia and Ukraine. This is due to the fact that Russia controls
Crimea (Nahaylo, 2020). Thus, this rhetorical will of Shmyhal to resupply Crimea with water is
an attempt to ease tensions between the Ukrainian and Russian governments.
Yermak
While Zelenskiy was appointing new government officials to his administration, Yermak
and representatives of Russia and OSCE agreed to the inclusion of the Ukrainian separatists in
the Advisory Council in Minsk, Belarus (Wesolowsky, 2020). Yermak asserted that the creation
of this council was not a form of concessions to the Ukrainian separatists (Wesolowsky, 2020).
Rather, he affirmed that the Advisory Council would create “a platform” of communication
between both parties in this war (Wesolowsky, 2020). It is evident that Yermak attempted to
demonstrate to the nationalist and veteran groups a sense of resolve against the rebels in this civil
war.
Protests
Amid these negotiations with the opposition of the war in eastern Ukraine, the nationalist
group, the Azov Regiment, aired a video to gain supporters against the presidency of Zelenskiy
and his attempts at negotiations (Kuzmenko, 2020). This group expressed its opposition to the
creation of the Advisory Council after OSECE, Ukrainian and Russian government met in Minsk
to negotiate over the war (Wesolowsky, 2020). The Advisory Council would permit ten
representatives from the separatist regions of Ukraine to join the Tripartite Contact Group with
its other members of the Ukrainian, Russian, French, and German governments, as well as with
OSCE (Wesolowsky, 2020). These nationalists expressed their resentment towards elements of
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the peace negotiations with the separatists and with Russia, namely over the recognition of the
separatist territories in this council (Wesolowsky, 2020). One member of the Azov Regiment
accused one of the advisers to the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Serhiy
Syvokho, of engaging with the separatists who let the “enemy” into Ukraine (RFE/RL's
Ukrainian Service, 2020b). In this case, the “enemy” referred to Russia, indicating the repeated
presence of fear towards Russian expansion is present in this statement of the Azov Regiment
members. This accusation of treason also indicates anger towards the separatists over their
involvement with Russia. Syvokho led the event called, the National Platform for Reconciliation
and Unity, on March 12th (RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service, 2020b). This platform and Syvokho
advocated for the reunification of the separatist regions into Ukraine (RFE/RL's Ukrainian
Service, 2020b). These nationalists and veterans used force to protest Syvokho, and pushed him
off his podium (RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service, 2020b).
Protests occurred in the streets towards the end of March 2020 as well. Street protestors
during this month continued to express their discontent with the Advisory Council, where they
expressed their uneasiness and fear over the Ukrainian government having to negotiate and
recognize the separatist regions (Melkozerova, 2020). Ukrainian veterans, including those that
have fought in the Donetsk conflict, viewed any withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the eastern
front as a sign of weakness and appeasement towards Russia and the Ukrainian separatists
(Melkozerova, 2020). Opposition to the proposition of granting civilians in the separatist
territories the right to vote also continued during this protest (Melkozerova, 2020). These
protests occurred despite the nation-wide lockdowns for the Covid-19 pandemic (Melkozerova,
2020).
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May 2020
Yermak
After he negotiated in Minsk, Yermak participated in an interview with the Atlantic
Council (Atlantic Council, 2020a). In an interview and discussion with the Atlantic Council,
Yermak stated that the Ukrainian government “will not stop” until the separatist territories
become unoccupied and are returned to Ukraine (Atlantic Council, 2020a). This is a continuation
of his stance taking in previous statements in 2020. He thanked the Western powers that have
helped Ukraine throughout this war in eastern Ukraine (Atlantic Council, 2020a). Yermak
admitted that multiple agreements made at the Normandy Four talks in December of 2019 had
not been completed, and that issues, such as landmines in the eastern part of Ukraine, were not
under agreement up to this point (Atlantic Council, 2020a). It seems that Yermak placed blame
upon the opposition parties of the war in eastern Ukraine for the current mishaps of the
agreements of the Normandy Four in 2019. Later in the interview, Yermak also asserted that the
“red lines” that Zelenskiy had created over the war in eastern Ukraine would not be altered
(Atlantic Council, 2020a). This statement demonstrates a will of the Ukrainian government not
concede to certain demands that the Russian government and/or the separatists make. Yermak
also mentioned that the Ukrainian government would not negotiate with the separatist
governments (Atlantic Council, 2020a). Rather, it would only accept representatives that only
held citizenship to Ukraine, and did not participate in activities against the country of Ukraine
(Atlantic Council, 2020a). These statements seem to have addressed the concerns of protesters
that took place in March of 2020 of the creation of the Advisory Council. Their rhetoric is also
opposite as to the practice of incorporating the separatists into the Advisory Council.
48

Despite this unyielding rhetoric, Yermak also stated in this interview that he sought to
meet with representatives of Russia and OSCE in Minsk again to discuss the issues that thwarted
the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (Atlantic Council, 2020a). This statement
demonstrates the willingness of Yermak and the government of Ukraine to talk with the
opposition to resolve the dilemmas in implementing these agreements. Yermak continued in this
interview, and reasserted that the Ukrainian government was willing to do everything in its
power to comply with the agreements made in Paris in 2019 (Atlantic Council, 2020a).
June 2020
Protests
Unrelated to the previous interview with Yermak, nationalist protestors rallied against
pro-Russian protests in Kyiv (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2020c). They proceeded to attack the
pro-Russian demonstrators with firecrackers and smoke grenades (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service,
2020c). This nationalist protest demonstrates anger towards Russia and those that are viewed as
favoring Russia.
July 2020
Zelenskiy
Despite some of the more hard-lined rhetoric of the Zelenskiy administration, the
governments of Ukraine, Russia, and OSCE agreed to a new cease-fire deal for the war in eastern
Ukraine (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2020d). This ceasefire was planned to come into effect
on July 27 of this year (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2020d). In the days prior to this cease-fire
date, Zelenskiy discussed with Putin the details of this ceasefire (Aljazeera, 2020). His
presidential office also released a statement which gave credit to the “Ukrainian delegation,” and
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international partners for creating this ceasefire agreement (DW, 2020). The attempt of Zelenskiy
to negotiate and create a ceasefire with Russia and the Ukrainian separatists shows his desire to
implement peace in Ukraine.
Shmyhal
Amid these negotiations with Russia, Shmyhal engaged in a conversation with Chatham
House on July 2020, where he discussed the progress of reforms in Ukraine, and the challenges
to implementing them (Chatham House, 2020). He stated that the Russian Federation had
“exacerbated” the issues that Covid-19 and economic stagnation brought to Ukraine (Chatham
House, 2020). This statement demonstrates negative rhetoric towards friendly relations with
Moscow. Shmyhal also thanked other countries that have supported Ukraine in this war
(Chatham House, 2020). Similar to the other government officials, this statement demonstrates
an attempt to appeal to outside allies in the war in eastern Ukraine.
Later this same month, Shmyhal visited Brussels to accept a loan to help battle the Covid19 outbreak in Ukraine (Herszenhorn, 2020). Shmyhal stated his want to visit Brussels, as it is
the capital of the EU (Herszenhorn, 2020). Shmyhal also stated that his visit to Brussels would
symbolize the “Westward trajectory” of Ukraine (Herszenhorn, 2020). He also stated the intent
of Ukraine to become a member of NATO (Herszenhorn, 2020). These statements of Shmyhal to
portray his admiration of Ukraine becoming like the West does not demonstrate rhetoric to
reconcile with Russia and the Ukrainian separatists. Rather, both the separatists and Russian
government seek to distance themselves from the West, and view NATO as hostile to their
interests (Masters, 2020). Shmyhal also stated that the Ukrainian government was thankful for
the EU sanction that targeted Russia (Herszenhorn, 2020). These sanctions were implemented to
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punish Russia for its takeover of Crimea, and its support of the separatists in eastern Ukraine
(Herszenhorn, 2020). This rhetoric seems negative toward the prospects of peace and
compromise with Russia and the Ukrainian separatists.
August 2020
Zelenskiy
In this month, Euronews conducted an interview with Zelenskiy to discuss his thoughts
on the issues he has faced as the president of Ukraine up to this point (Euronews, 2020). His
rhetoric was different than that of Shmyhal, where Zelenskiy used a combination of positive and
negative rhetoric in regards to peace. He commented on the progress in eastern Ukraine, in
regards to the agreements made at the Normandy format meeting in Paris during 2019
(Euronews, 2020). Zelenskiy stated that this progress towards fulfilling the agreements in eastern
Ukraine was moving ahead, but not as swift as he would prefer it to be progressing (Euronews,
2020). He claimed that the prisoner exchanges conducted in 2019 and the agreement to withdraw
forces from other parts of eastern Ukraine were signs of movements towards de-escalation
(Euronews, 2020). However, he admitted that he was unsure of when these agreements in late2019 would be fulfilled (Euronews, 2020). Yet, Zelenskiy continued, and reassured the news
reporter that the future Normandy format meeting could lead to the end of the war in eastern
Ukraine (Euronews, 2020). He even stated that if this war was up to him, he would end it that
day (Euronews, 2020). This rhetoric is optimistic for peace in Ukraine, and demonstrates the
willingness of Zelenskiy to pursue peace in this war. This positive rhetoric also demonstrates that
Zelenskiy continued to appeal to both his voting base and to the nationalist interest groups.
Zelenskiy continued in this interview, and stated that he was the only individual that could end
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the war quickly (Euronews, 2020). When questioned on the Normandy format, Zelenskiy stated
that while there were alternative peace plans, none would be as efficient as the Normandy format
(Euronews, 2020). However, he stated that if the Normandy format does not work out, then he
will seek “other options.” (Euronews, 2020). This statement seems to be more negative towards
the prospects of this plan being successful in implementing peace in Ukraine.
When questioned on his interactions with Putin in this interview, Zelenskiy stated that he
was willing to talk with the Russian president if it meant moving towards peace in the war in
eastern Ukraine (Euronews, 2020). He asserted that he does not care what certain individuals
think of his meeting with Putin (Euronews, 2020). Yet, he stated that both territories belong to
Ukraine, and must return to Ukrainian possession (Euronews, 2020). This statement seems to be
hostile of their being independent republics and territories in eastern Ukraine. This independence
is a top priority for the Ukrainian separatists. Thus, such a statement seems to be less
compromising to these separatists.
In this interview with Euronews, Zelenskiy also commented on the role of the U.S. and
Western Europe in their support of Ukraine (Euronews, 2020). He expressed his appreciation for
the support of the U.S. in military support, and in the U.S. and Western European countries
implementing economic sanctions upon the Russian government (Euronews, 2020). This praise
demonstrates positive rhetoric towards outside support for Ukraine. Zelenskiy also stated the
attempt of his government to pursue EU membership expectations so that Ukraine could become
a part of the EU (Euronews, 2020). This ambition to become a part of the EU could be an issue
with negotiating with Russia, whose government is not in favor of Ukraine leaving its sphere of
influence (Higgins, 2019).
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September 2020
Yermak
In the month following month after the Euronews interview with Zelenskiy, Yermak met
with the ambassadors of the G7 countries (President of Ukraine, 2020b). He thanked these
countries for their support of the Ukrainian government during this war, and reassured them that
a new meeting based on the Normandy format would take place in the future (President of
Ukraine, 2020b).
In another statement this same month, Yermak reasserted the demands of the Ukrainian
government for there to be a withdrawal of occupying troops from the separatist regions of
Ukraine (President of Ukraine, 2020c). Yermak admitted that while the meeting in Berlin
between advisors of Russia, Germany, France, and Ukraine did not result in easy negotiations, he
stated that the ceasefire made earlier that year was thus far being implemented on both sides of
the conflict (President of Ukraine, 2020c). He also emphasized that the Ukrainian government
was working for the national interests of Ukraine (President of Ukraine, 2020c), which
demonstrates an attempt of Yermak to appear strong and patriotic amid the Ukrainian public and
interest groups. Thus, there seems to have been a combination of hard-lined and diplomatic
rhetoric in these statements of Yermak during these months.
Bohdan
During this same month that the current presidential chief of staff discussed the talks of
withdrawing Russian troops from eastern Ukraine, Bohdan participated in an interview with
Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Hordon, where he discussed Crimea and the relations between the
Ukrainian and Russian governments (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2020e). In this interview,
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Bohdan stated that the administration of Zelenskiy of not maintaining their commitments and
agreements to Putin (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, 2020e). Rather, he accused the administration
of engaging in non-disclosed agreements with Russia, and of there being a pro-Russian group
within the ranks of the Ukrainian government (Vorobiov, 2020). Bohdan also alleged that this
pro-Russian circle sought to expel all Ukrainian politicians that favored the West and Western
integration, and that Zelenskiy did not know what he was doing as the president of Ukraine
(Vorobiov, 2020). These allegations are most likely an act of revenge of Bohdan against
Zelenskiy intended to cause controversy within the Ukrainian government and in the faith of the
Ukrainian public towards Zelenskiy. Yet, this rhetoric of Bohdan, who was an influential
politician within the Zelenskiy administration, seems to be not in favor of compromise or in
easing relations with the Russian government. This rhetoric of Bohdan possesses the potential to
energize veteran and nationalist interest groups in Ukraine against Zelenskiy.
A few days later, the State Bureau of Investigation in Ukraine questioned Bohdan over
his allegations of possible treason in the Zelenskiy administration (UNIAN, 2020c). These
officials found no evidence of illegal collaboration between the Ukrainian and Russian
governments (UNIAN, 2020c). This could be seen as an attempt of the Ukrainian government
and Zelenskiy to silence those that make statements are opposed to peace in eastern Ukraine.
However, there is no evidence to support this assertion.
October 2020
Zelenskiy
Local elections were conducted throughout Ukraine during this month (Karmanau, 2020).
However, Zelenskiy and the Ukrainian government did not permit them to be conducted in the
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separatist regions of Ukraine (Karmanau, 2020). This seems contrary to the earlier statements of
Zelenskiy to pursue elections in these areas of Ukraine. The reasoning for this abstaining of
elections in these regions of Ukraine was likely due to the lack of control of these eastern
regions, and of the eastern border with Russia.
Yermak
During the month of these elections, Yermak discussed with the public and press in Great
Britain the protests that were occurring in Belarus (Wintour, 2020). During this discussion,
Yermak also discussed the ceasefire that was in effect in the eastern regions of Ukraine
(Wintour, 2020). He stated that while there was a risk of a break in the ceasefire, which was
implemented earlier that year, the goal of the Ukrainian government was to not agitate Russian
aggression towards Ukraine (Wintour, 2020). Up to this point in October, there was one casualty
in this ceasefire agreement (Wintour, 2020).
November 2020
Honcharuk
After the local elections in Ukraine were completed, Honcharuk discussed with the
Atlantic Council the issues of implementing reforms in Ukraine (Atlantic Council, 2020b). In
this discussion, Honcharuk claimed that the Russian government sought to undermine the
institutions of the Ukrainian state (Atlantic Council, 2020b). He also asserted that Russia sought
to destabilize the relationships between Ukraine and Western countries (Atlantic Council,
2020b). When answering a question from the audience related to the influence of Russia in
Ukraine, Honcharuk stated that the Russian government used a large investment of resources to
use media sources as tools to “brainwash” Ukrainians (Atlantic Council, 2020b). Honcharuk then
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alluded to his previous statements that Russian aggression posed as a threat to the democratic
world (Atlantic Council, 2020b). Again, these assertions of Honcharuk place blame on the
Russian government for the obstacles to reforming Ukraine. While these statements may be true,
stating them publicly will cause further hostilities between Ukraine and Russia in the war in
eastern Ukraine.
December 2020
Zelenskiy
In an address to Ukrainians on New Year’s Eve, Zelenskiy discussed the challenges that
Ukraine faced during the year 2020 (see Appendix E) (Telekanal DOM, 2020). He stated that the
creation of checkpoints earlier in the year permitted the people from eastern Ukraine to see
which government will treat them as “hostages” (Telekanal DOM, 2020). This statement alludes
to the Russians and Ukrainian separatists to be the ones that are the antagonists in this war,
which will not sit well with the other side of this war. Later on in this public address, Zelenskiy
stated that the Ukrainian government would not abandon any of its citizens, and would accept
and bring them back from “basements in Donbas” or from “a Russian prison” (Telekanal DOM,
2020). This statement can be interpreted as both positive and negative rhetoric towards peace in
the war in Ukraine. It is positive rhetoric where this statement demonstrates a willingness of
Zelenskiy to accept back Ukrainians in the separatist regions back into Ukrainian society. It is
also negative where Zelenskiy again alludes to the opposition in being the antagonists in this
war. In this public announcement, Zelenskiy also expressed his satisfaction of the current
ceasefire in the Donbas region (Telekanal DOM, 2020). While he admitted that this ceasefire
was imperfect, he stated that it saved more lives than if it were not in place (Telekanal DOM,
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2020). This statement consists of optimistic rhetoric for peace in eastern Ukraine. Zelenskiy
continued in his address to the nation, and stated his intent to celebrate New Year’s with those in
the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea regions of Ukraine (Telekanal DOM, 2020). This statement
can be taken as a positive sign of Zelenskiy seeking to end the war in eastern Ukraine. However,
this statement can also be interpreted as negative rhetoric towards peace, where Zelenskiy could
be implying that he plans to reunite the separatist regions of Ukraine no matter the cost.
Yermak
Prior to this New Year’s address of Zelenskiy, Yermak asserted in a public statement that
the Ukrainian government sought peace in the war in Ukraine (President of Ukraine, 2020d). He
stated that the meeting of the Normandy Four countries and their leaders in 2019 permitted the
release of prisoners in this war, as well as the eventual ceasefire, and that there needed to be
another meeting of the leaders of these four countries (President of Ukraine, 2020d). He claimed
that such a meeting of the Normandy Four leaders would create a plan on conducting the
elements of the Minsk agreements (President of Ukraine, 2020d). Yermak defended these
negotiations, where he asserted that there were fewer losses of Ukrainian soldiers in this war, and
that the negotiations to end the war are moving along (President of Ukraine, 2020d). He also
stated that the government of Ukraine would continue to defend the national interests of its
country (President of Ukraine, 2020d). All of these statements of Yermak demonstrate his and
the government of Ukraine’s willingness to pursue peace, and that negotiations are the best path
forward to achieving the national interests of Ukraine. However, Yermak also made clear that the
Russian government must demonstrate is willingness to pursue peace in the separatist regions of
Ukraine (President of Ukraine, 2020d).
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Days later, Yermak announced that the advisers to the Normandy Four leaders were
planning to meet in the first month of 2021 (UNIAN, 2020d). He stated that the governments of
the four governments agreed on the clearing of landmines in 19 areas in eastern Ukraine, as well
as the withdrawal of forces and weapons in four new areas around the battle areas of the war in
Ukraine (UNIAN, 2020d).
January 2021
Yermak
In the first month of this year, Yermak met with other advisors to the leaders of the
Normandy Four countries in Berlin, Germany (President of Ukraine, 2021). During these
meetings in Berlin, the advisors discussed the progress of the agreements made in the Normandy
Four meeting in 2019, and agreed to the necessity of upholding the ceasefire along the
battlegrounds in eastern Ukraine (President of Ukraine, 2021).
February 2021
Zelenskiy
Contrary to previous rhetoric that was positive towards peace, Zelenskiy and his
government imposed sanctions upon a Russian ally and Ukrainian politician, Viktor
Medvedchuk (AFP, 2021; Milakovsky, 2021). This individual owns news channels that are
biased to favoring Russia (Milakovsky, 2021). He also made the decision to ban pro-Russian
news stations from airing on television within Ukraine (Milakovsky, 2021). These news channels
included Zik, 112 Ukraina, and NewsOne (Milakovsky, 2021). In a statement on Twitter, while
Zelenskiy expressed his goal to maintain free speech within Ukraine, he asserted that these news
stations were “propaganda” of an “aggressor country that undermines Ukraine on its way to the
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#EU & EuroAtlantic integration” (Milakovsky, 2021). This statement is hostile towards the
Russian government. Moreover, the written statement of Zelenskiy on Twitter demonstrates his
commitment towards Ukraine becoming a part of the EU and NATO. As mentioned earlier, such
goals are against the interests of the Russian government, and the Ukrainian separatists. Thus,
this lack of compromise and of shared interests does not bode well to achieving a peace deal to
this war in Ukraine.
Shmyhal
In the following month of these sanctions against Russia, Shmyhal continued this
negative rhetoric in regards to peace. He and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
conducted a “joint press point” (NATO News, 2021). They discussed the prospects of Ukraine
becoming a member of NATO in the future (NATO News, 2021). He reiterated the statements of
Zelenskiy, and asserted that the Ukrainian government would build a naval base in the Black
Sea, and the Azov Sea (NATO News, 2021). Stoltenberg also stated that the Black Sea is an
important area for NATO forces (NATO News, 2021). This is due to Russian aggression in
Ukraine, and in the Black Sea (NATO News, 2021). Given this, the fact that Ukraine is
endeavoring to build naval bases in the Black Sea, and attempting to become a member of
NATO will result in the Russian government believing that its supremacy in this sea is at risk.
With these moves being in conjunction with attempts to end the war in Ukraine, it is probable
that Russia will retain, and possibly strengthen, its support of separatists in eastern Ukraine so as
to weaken the power of Ukraine to build such bases in the Black Sea. Shmyhal also stated that
Russia is demonstrating its aggression with cyber-attacks and propaganda items in Ukraine
(NATO News, 2021).
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A day later, Shmyhal, who was in Brussels at this time, accused Russia of using their
Covid-19 vaccine to increase their political influence in the separatist regions of Ukraine
(Herszenhorn, 2021). He claimed that this attempt of Russia to use the Covid-19 vaccine to
bolster their influence was also occurring in Eastern Europe (Herszenhorn, 2021). Shmyhal
asserted that the EU should send a “strong signal” to Ukraine and the public that the EU would
be providing vaccines to Ukrainians (Herszenhorn, 2021). According to Shmyhal, this signal
would help Ukraine counter this Covid-19 diplomacy of Russia (Herszenhorn, 2021). While
these accusations may be factual, stating them in public will not demonstrate to Russia, or to the
separatists, an attempt to ease relations. Rather, these statements of Shmyhal demonstrate a
desire of the Ukrainian government to seek more help from the EU and West than from Russia,
Moreover, these statements portray Russia as an antagonist. Thus, these statements of Shmyhal
seem to have consisted of negative rhetoric to the prospects of peace in eastern Ukraine.
On February 11th, Shmyhal also spoke at the EU-Ukrainian Association Council (EU
Debates | eudebates.tv, 2021). After speaking of the goals of the Ukrainian government to form
greater relations with the EU, he stated that Ukraine was still fighting for its “independence”
against Russian aggression, and that he was thankful for the EU for its support for Ukraine
against such aggression (EU Debates | eudebates.tv, 2021). Again, this statement portrays Russia
as the antagonist and enemy of Ukraine. He also stated that the Ukrainian government wished for
the EU to “expand its sanction list” (EU Debates | eudebates.tv, 2021). Thus, Shmyhal was
insistent on continuing to mount pressure and economic repercussions against Russia rather than
cooperate with them or the separatists over eastern Ukraine. Like his other statements in
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February 2021, Shmyhal did not mention the wish of the Ukrainian government to negotiate with
Russia, and/or the Ukrainian separatists.
Honcharuk
In the same month as the current prime minister of Ukraine made public statement in
Europe in regards to EU integration and Russian aggression, Honcharuk participated in an
interview and discussion with the Ukrainian Research Institute Harvard University (Ukrainian
Research Institute Harvard University, 2021). In this interview, he discussed Russian aggression,
and the obstacles to reforming Ukraine (Ukrainian Research Institute Harvard University, 2021).
He declared that the aggression between Ukraine and Russia is part of the “Second Cold War”
(Ukrainian Research Institute Harvard University, 2021). This is a definitive statement, where
Honcharuk implies that Russia and the West are at war. Similar to past statements, Honcharuk
stated that Russia continues to dismantle Ukraine and its reform progress, and that Ukraine is in
the middle of the battle between the authoritarian world, and the democratic world (Ukrainian
Research Institute Harvard University, 2021). He also charged Russia with being the most
aggressive country in this struggle between authoritarianism and democracy (Ukrainian Research
Institute Harvard University, 2021). He continued and stated that Russia attempted to influence
Ukrainians that democracy was a failure in Ukraine, and prevent it from being a part of the
Western world, and that this issue in Ukraine was an issue for the rest of the democratic world
(Ukrainian Research Institute Harvard University, 2021). Thus, these statements of Honcharuk
are similar to his past ones, which indicate a lack of significant change in rhetoric on Russia and
the war in eastern Ukraine. Rather, it seems that his rhetoric has become more negative towards
Russia and its influence in Ukraine.
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March 2021
Zelenskiy
After his current prime minister asserted negative rhetoric in regards to peace, Zelenskiy
expressed his determination to meet with each leader of the Normandy format separately if this
summit continued to be delayed (UNIAN, 2021a). The president of Ukraine insisted that this
meeting not be delayed any longer, as the issue of solving peace in eastern Ukraine was essential
(UNIAN, 2021a). This commitment of Zelenskiy to move along the Normandy format meetings
shows positive rhetoric towards pursuing peace in this war in Ukraine.
Yermak
However, during this same month that Zelenskiy made these previous statements that
were in favor of peace in eastern Ukraine, Yermak claimed that there was a rise in violence on
the front –lines in the war in Ukraine (AFP, 2021). He accused the Russian government for the
rise in violence in eastern Ukraine, and pleaded with France, Germany, and the U.S. to help
resolve this violence (AFP, 2021). This rhetoric of Yermak seems aggressive towards Russia,
and increasingly hostile towards the prospects of peace in eastern Ukraine, where he placed
blame on Russia for the outbreak of violence in this war. Moreover, his appeal to outside allies to
intervene in this rise of violence demonstrates his desire to obtain and retain third-party
assistance in resolving this war. However, he also stated during this month that the government
of Ukraine was waiting on Russia to approve the peace plan that Ukraine, France, and Germany
proposed (UNIAN, 2021b). He stated his optimism of this plan, and hoped that Russia would
sign onto it (UNIAN, 2021b). These statements demonstrate the optimistic rhetoric of the
Ukrainian government in favor of peace, and for negotiating an end to the war.
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Protests
Nationalist protestors were present in Kyiv on the birthday of Serhiy Sternenko, who is a
far-right activist (Churm, 2021). Sternenko was the leader of the nationalist organization called
“Right Sector,” and was convicted in a Ukrainian court for his involvement in the assault and
kidnapping of an elected official in 2015 (Churm, 2021). He is also investigation for charges of
murder (Bobrovska, 2021). These protestors called for the release of Sternenko, and lit-off
fireworks in protest of his imprisonment (Churm, 2021). Prior to his conviction, Sternenko
advocated against banning those who held pro-Russian sympathies from entering Ukraine, and
has attacked pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine (Bobrovska, 2021). Thus, these protests
demonstrate continued anger towards Russia and its involvement in Ukraine.
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DISCUSSION
Before examining the implication of these results on the claims made in this paper, it is
important to address two main alternative explanations that could explain the change of rhetoric
of Zelenskiy towards the prospects of peace in eastern Ukraine. The first alternative explanation
includes that Zelenskiy is incompetent when it comes to foreign affairs, namely with his lack of a
political background. An argument could be made that Zelenskiy does not know the
consequences of his actions and words in the international realm, which has resulted in the
conflict in Ukraine to continue. However, I do not agree with this argument. This research
included multiple Ukrainian government officials that have been in the Zelenskiy administration.
These government officials included those with and without government experience prior to their
appointments. Even if Zelenskiy were incompetent, it is difficult to place all of the blame on him
for the continuation of this war.
Another possible explanation for the change in rhetoric of Zelenskiy includes Russia
being aggressive and unreliable in its implementation of peace agreements in this civil war. This
argument is a plausible explanation of the change in rhetoric of Zelenskiy and the other members
of his administration. One of these aggressive actions included the distribution of Russian
passports in the separatist regions of Ukraine, which Ukrainians view as a violation of their
territorial sovereignty (Kuzio, 2020). Russian naval ships also continue to patrol the Ukrainian
Azov Sea coast (Kuzio, 2020). It is expected that the leader and government of one country
respond with hostile rhetoric and/or actions towards an outside power that is hostile towards
them. A more aggressive policy towards Russia, on the part of Ukraine, could be a form of
retaliation to these intimidating Russian maneuvers. Future research could study Russian
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hostilities towards Ukraine and this impact on the rhetoric of Zelenskiy and member of his
administration.
The findings of the claims stated earlier in this paper demonstrate hostile emotions of the
Ukrainian special interest groups towards the opposition in this civil war. These hostile emotions
were expressed in multiple protests in Ukraine, which influenced members of the Zelenskiy
administration to appeal to these demands. Referring back to these claims, this paper found the
first claim to be supported, where Ukrainian protestors of nationalist interest groups expressed
their anger towards Russia and its involvement in the war in eastern Ukraine. As mentioned in
the results section of this paper, these protests were against any form of forgiveness on the part
of the Ukrainian government to the Ukrainian separatists.
The evidence in this paper also supports that resentment of interest groups towards parts
of peace agreements hinders the prospect to peace in civil wars. They felt that certain peace
agreements, such as the formation of the Advisory Council, placed them and Ukraine in an
unfavorable position compared to the opposition. In the protests that this paper examined, this
resentment resulted in these nationalist groups to demand and call for the disbanding of the peace
agreements.
The evidence gathered in this paper falsifies the third claim. There did not seem to be
resentment of the special interest groups towards the opposition. Based on the protests of the
nationalist interest groups in Ukraine, they seemed to express fear towards the outside country,
Russia. These interest groups did not trust the Russian government to abide by the peace
agreements, and they believed that Russia would take advantage of any sort of compromise and
negotiation attempts that the Ukrainian government created. Such fear creates distrust towards
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the opposition in the civil war, a lack of compromise and finding of common ground in
negotiations.
This paper found the fourth claim to be supported, but limited in its extent. Some
protestors that were part of Ukrainian nationalist groups expressed some fear of a limitation of
support from Western Europeans, and expressed their desire to become a part of NATO and the
EU. However, this fear was not present and prevalent at all, or even most, of the protests studied
in this paper. Instead, this paper found that the rhetoric of the Ukrainian government officials
appealed to the third-party actor of Germany, towards France, and towards the U.S., indicating
that the Ukrainian government fears a limitation of third-party support more than the special
interest groups. As mentioned earlier, this paper considers Germany to be the third-party actor in
this case study, where it attempts to mediate and negotiate an end to the civil war. Thus, it seems
that this fear of not receiving outside support, namely from the West, has resulted in the
government of Ukraine to attempt to appeal to these countries with its expressed desire to join
NATO and the EU. As mentioned earlier in this paper, Russia views NATO and EU expansion
as hostile to its interests (Masters, 2020). This desire of Ukraine to join these Western
institutions makes it difficult for the third-party actor, Germany, to negotiate an end to this civil
war. Germany is a member of the EU and NATO. Thus, the desire of Ukraine to become a part
of these institutions makes it seem that Western European countries, such as Germany, are
supportive of this expansion of Western institutions into the Russian sphere of influence.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence in this research supports the theory presented in this paper. The rhetoric of
Ukrainian government officials included in this paper does seem to become gradually more
hostile and negative towards peace. This study made use of a qualitative analysis and of a case
study in the civil war in Ukraine. This approach differed from some previous research, which
operationalized the successes and failure of third-party interventions in civil wars with variables,
such as casualties and durations of conflicts. Unlike most of the previous research on qualitative
analyses that focused on the motivations of actors in civil wars, this research examined the
impact of one side, the Ukrainian government, on the conditions of failure of third-party
interventions.
However, the evidence does not demonstrate a complete alteration in the rhetoric of
Ukrainian officials from positive rhetoric to negative rhetoric regarding peace prospects in
eastern Ukraine. Rather, this rhetoric shifted from positive rhetoric to a combination of positive
and negative rhetoric. It seems that Zelenskiy and other officials in his administration attempted
to appeal to both the nationalist special interest groups and his voting base at the same time. The
Zelenskiy administration emphasized its intents to become a part of the EU and NATO, while
also attempting to reunify Ukraine. Ukraine cannot achieve both objectives, as Russia possesses
the interest of maintaining a Ukraine government that is not a part of these Western institutions.
Moreover, it is also not in the interests of the Ukrainian separatists to be a part of the EU and
NATO, where they instead prefer to be closer to Russia. Given the assumption that the
international system is anarchic, this combination of positive and negative rhetoric of the
Zelenskiy administration creates an environment of confusion for the opposition. This confusion
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results in a lack of understanding of interests of the one side of the civil war, which hinders the
ability of both sides to compromise and find common interests.
This paper is limited in several aspects. This research focused on one side of a civil war,
and the rhetoric of its officials. This paper did not include the reactions of the opposition to this
rhetoric. Rather, based on the assumption that the international system is in a state of anarchy, it
was deduced that negative rhetoric of one side of this civil war results in its opposition to react in
a hostile manner. Future research related to this theory could examine the interests of special
interest groups within third-party countries, and examine how these interest groups impact the
government officials of these third-parties to intervene in civil wars. Research related to this
topic could also examine the impact of special interest groups that are in favor of peace in civil
wars upon the rhetoric of their government officials. Another potential research route could
examine the impact of special interest groups on the rhetoric of government officials in
democratic and authoritarian countries. This research also used news sources in this paper for the
bulk of my research. News sources, such as Ukrainian ones used in this paper, can possess
biases. Yet, these news sources provided access to rhetoric that Ukrainian government officials
made in public announcements. This research was unable to include the rhetoric of Ukrainian
government officials towards the end of the presidential term of Zelenskiy. It was limited to the
first 2 years of his presidency. This research utilized a case study where there was no variation in
failure and success of third-party interventions. Future research could use cases of civil wars
with third-party interventions of which third-party interventions failed in some and succeeded in
others as the dependent variable to the research. Moreover, this research is limited in that it
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examined one condition that resulted in third-party interventions to fail. Future research could
test other plausible conditions that can result in third-parties to fail in their interventions.
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APPENDIX A: ZELENSKY’S SPEECH: CRIMEA AND DONBASS ARE
UKRAINIAN LAND1

1

Translated by Olga Krasylnikova.
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Zelensky's Speech: Crimea and Donbass are Ukrainian Land
Our next challenge is bringing back the lost territories. To be honest, I think this wording
is not quite correct since we cannot lose something that is ours by right. Both Crimea and
Donbass are Ukrainian land where we have lost more than just territories. We have lost what
matters most — the people. And today we must — I am sure they hear us — bring back their
consciousness. We have lost this consciousness. Over these years, the government has done
nothing for them to feel Ukrainian. They are not strangers. They are ours, they are Ukrainian.
Because being Ukrainian... I want to say: yes, we are all Ukrainians wherever we live, for being
Ukrainian is not a line in a passport. Being Ukrainian is a feeling in your heart.
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APPENDIX B: ZELENSKY IN ODESA CONGRATULATE SEAMEN ON DAY
OF NAVAL FORCES. NASH JULY 7, 20192

2

Translated by Olga Krasylnikova.
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Zelensky in Odesa Congratulates Seamen on Day of Naval Forces. NASH July 7, 2019
Anchorman: And we have already mentioned that Volodymyr Zelensky is in Odesa today. Let's
watch his live speech.
V. Zelensky: ... region, Ukrainian sea soldiers each day bravely and heroically defend our sea
boundaries, our freedom and independence. Unfortunately, often at a much too high price
— at the price of their lives. At the beginning of the week, we have received painful news
from Donbass: two young sea soldiers and medics died due to shelling on a medical
vehicle near the Vodiane settlement. Leading seaman Sergiy Grygoryevych Maiboroda
and health officer sergeant Iryna Viktorivna Shevchenko. I ask you to observe a minute
of silence, please.
[01:05] Voice off-camera: Take off your headwear.
[02:05] Take on your headwear.
V. Zelensky: Dear warriors, our common goal is the strong Naval Forces of Ukraine, equipped
with modern ships, weapons and technical equipment. On this path, we feel significant
support from our international friends and partners who today stand in the line together
with you. I am glad to congratulate participants of the Ukrainian-American exercise "Sea
Breeze 2019". It includes three thousand soldiers from 19 countries. By participating, you
raise the level of sea and field training [03:00] as well as the level of congruence of
multinational subunits. This week, as you know, I made an official visit to Canada where
we have agreed to strengthen our defense cooperation. And I know that today, the
Minister of Defence Mr. Taran will discuss specific steps of this cooperation in detail.
The families of our captured sailors are here today. I bow to you for your courage and
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endurance. I am not going to say much. Trust me, we work day and night to bring our
sailors back home. I personally do everything so that the words about the return, the longawaited [04:00] return, finally turn into your tight hugs with your boys. Dear navy
sailors, on behalf of the Ukrainian people, many thanks to all personnel for their loyalty
to the oath, fortitude, courage and dedication. I once again congratulate you on your
professional holiday. I wish you a clear fairway, fair winds and following seas. Allow me
to conclude the congratulation with the words from the match of the Naval Forces of
Ukraine,
"Let there always be calm in the sea,
And if the alarm bell rings,
Sailors will go against the waves
And raise the flag of victory".
[05:00] Glory to Ukraine.
All: Glory to the Heroes.
Voice off-camera: We are starting the ceremony of presenting state awards of Ukraine and
conferring honorary titles to the 36th Separate Marine Brigade and the Naval Lyceum.
The decrees of the President of Ukraine are announced by the Deputy Head of the Office
of the President of Ukraine Ruslan Riaboshapka.
R. Riaboshapka: By the decree of the President of Ukraine, for personal courage shown in
protecting the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, exemplary
performance of military duties, and in honor of the Day of the Naval Forces and the
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Armed Forces of Ukraine, lieutenant Ruslan Oleksandrovych Lyushukov is awarded the
Order of Courage, class III. [06:00]
R. Lyushukov: I serve the Ukrainian people.
R. Riaboshapka: The Medal For Military Service to Ukraine is awarded to Volodymyr
Mykolayevych Belsky, captain of the second rank.
V. Belsky: I serve the Ukrainian people.
R. Riaboshapka: The coat of arms is awarded to Vasyl Vasylyevych, lieutenant commander.
V. Vasylyevych: I serve the Ukrainian people.
R. Riaboshapka: The "Defender of the Motherland" Medal is awarded to Andii Oleksiyovych
Agapytov, [07:00] captain of the second rank.
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APPENDIX C: FULL VIDEO OF THE SCANDOLOUS COVNERSATION
BETWEEN ZELENSKY AND VOLUNTEERS IN ZOLOTE3

3

Translated by Olga Krasylnikova.
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Full Video of the Scandalous Conversation Between Zelensky and Volunteers in Zolote
Cells in the table show phrases of different people. If a new cell begins, it means another
person is speaking.
Vladimir Zelensky’s words are in semibold; text that appears on the screen is in italic.
Time
0:09

English
Hello!
Bring peace to us!
We’ll fight.
We’ll overcome.
We’ll overcome.
Why are you picking on it? They live here.

0:26

On the cusp of peace.

0:33

Chuguev Airport, 5:20 p.m.

0:58

Sievierodonetsk Airport, 6:20 p.m.

1:10

Checkpoint of entry/exit “Zolote”, 7:20 p.m.
This is the very line where we will withdraw troops to. They will stand here.
I see. Right here.
Yes, right here. This is the 72nd Brigade. The very battalion. Those who are in a
position here.
Right.
Those who will be ready to fulfill the disengagement order once the decision is
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made.
Let me please…
You are in command here.
We would like to invite you to our dinner so you see how military men are now
here…
All right.
The thing is we would like…
Good evening.
Be our guest please.
Yes? May I?
These are buckwheat flatbread that we cooked.
Girls, come on in.
Buckwheat flatbread?
Buckwheat, right? Awesome.
Oh, you see… Cutlets.
2:05

They say it’s “disengagement in Zolote”. But in fact, the Zolote town does not
fall under the disengagement.
Right you are.
Not a single street, not a single [2:12 inaudible]. Katerynivka is included.
Actually, today around 150 people live there in the disengagement area.
If needed, we have a to-go box. We can pack your food in it.
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[Laughs]
But you will need to return the box later.
It was delicious.
Girls, thank you, it was delicious.
As you say. We can go to the front line now.
I would suggest tomorrow morning.
But when they shoot, they shoot at night. That is why it would be
interesting to go there at night.
We are literally 200 meters away from the place they shoot from, from the
position.
Well. I feel like going there to our guys.
Look, if we do, then… Well? Let’s go then.
3:03

Let’s go and see. Many?
Toyota or what? Or the armored one?
Well, [3:06 inaudible] one. It doesn’t matter. We can go in one car.
Let’s go?
I don’t see it, honestly.
It’s okay.

3:19

Drive to the front line, 8:20 p.m.
Whose helmet is it? Thank you.
Well, you should have had a look there, of course. It’s not allowed but…
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Heroes, I don’t know, I haven’t seen anything there, half of it.
I’m holding my ground.
3:52

School #7, meeting, 9:20 p.m.
The situation within 24 hours was controllable. Our troops have not been [3:57
inaudible] from the distance of the enemy positions.

4:04

We have an appointment. We have Serhiy Haidai, a new head of the
Luhansk Oblast Public Administration. Basically, I would like to
thank the governor who was there before that. He wasn’t there for
long because, with all due respect, we agreed upon doing certain
things, apart from talking, very fast. Let’s say, he is not very fast. I
do believe and hope that you will be there for longer. [Laughs]
I don’t know if I will be there for longer…
Longer means more effective. I congratulate you.
Thank you all. See you.

Come in.
5:01

Overnight stop at a local’s, 10 p.m.
Personally, I took my shoes off.
Let the guys come in and have a look.
Guys, come in.
Come in, have a look.
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Inspector?
This is the inspector. [Laughs]
No, it’s all right. These are our boys.
May we? Since we’ll stay there for the night…
What is your name?
Tolik.
Nice to meet you, Tolik.
Thank you for renting it out to us.
So, is it your parents’ house?
[Nods]
Cool. We’ll stay there at your place for one night. Do you mind?
[Shakes his head]
Do you live here now, in this house?
I do.
So we’re staying there together?
Well, if needed, I can go to my neighbors…
[Laughs]
If needed, to neighbors…
Please, this is your house.
But we are renting it out, you see. We are honest. You just didn’t know
whom you rent it to.
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Of course, I didn’t. How could I?
That’s right. Our intelligence is working well.
And what is needed here in general? What do people in Zolote lack?
6:00

We need peace. Everyone is tired of that war.
Everyone wants war.
Of course.
Sure, it’s right. Thank you. We’ll finish studying everything here
tomorrow. Let’s not say goodbye.
We will sleep on that bed. The bed is all right. Okay, guys. See, there is
even a TV and DVD. [Laughs] It’s all right.

We came to visit you. Please, you go first.
Sure.
And you second. We will follow you.
Thank you.
7:01

Zolote, conversation with teachers, 8 a.m.
Good morning.
Good morning. I can’t run as fast as you drive. You drove past me. I was
running fast.
No worries. You should have waved to us and we would have given you a
lift.
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I said that I am grateful to my colleagues. They are steady people, you see. In
such conditions. Our staff is female.
Aleksandrovna will prove it. When the fire was tough, I wanted to go to work, I
wanted stability, I wanted to see children’s eyes and my colleagues.
To just calm down.
I try to send her on sick leave but she keeps saying, “No, I’m going to work.”
She calls me and I say, “But you feel bad. I know you do feel bad.” “No.
I’m going to work.” And so she is. No matter if they fire or not… If they
do, she waits for a while and then continues walking.
Yes, and then you come to a lesson and children’s hands are trembling or they
have fear in their eyes. “Oh, Irina Valeryevna, we pulled out a bullet
there…” “And we have…” “And we…” Children share things very
often. So the morning starts with their stories about what happened at
home. And not always… I mean at first, we bring children to a working
state, we bring them to reality, and only then we can start working.
8:14

Start teaching.
Right, start teaching.
Could you tell me… You do call up your relatives there somehow, don’t
you?
I don’t. My family has moved from there, so, no, I don’t.
You don’t? And what about friends?
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You know, we here are so used to the fact that we are trying to survive in the
conditions sent to us… And we are trying to find ourselves in what we
have here. The same happens there. People have stayed not because they
are against someone or for someone. They just want to survive.
I have relatives on that side too. A lot of relatives. We call each other and they
tell me, “Be happy that you are in Ukraine… You leave in a country.”
That’s it.
9:00

Actually, you know that people in our society have different opinions on it.
Some think that people there don’t want to be in Ukraine, so we
should separate from them and develop our part of the country, and
the day will come when they return. But I’m certain of the same
thing that you said. I am sure that many people there simply have
no possibility. That is why our viewpoint is to not abandon them.
We never thought that our tiny cozy settlement will become so infamous…
The Rodina mine.
The Rodina mine, the Zolote town. Right. Both names are so beautiful and
optimistic: the Homeland mine and the Golden town. And there we are
in this situation. We would really like it to…
Now the town’s name is confirmed. They are right to say that the homeland
begins from us. The homeland has begun from us and Ukraine is now
starting from our town.

10:10

Temporarily.
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We wish it started farther…
We will bring everything back.
We’ll fight.
We’ll overcome.
We’ll overcome.
Hello.
Hello. We are so glad.
You are? I’m very pleased.
Hello.
Bring peace to us!
Please say it.
Understood. We will.
Please.
Please. We beg you. Not for ourselves but for our children and grandchildren.
Peace.
We are for the disengagement.
You are for the disengagement?
Yes, we personally are.
We will do it.
Thank you so much.
… to wait for peace.
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You know when they said by the shop that you had come… No one knew. It’s
just that shop…
And what did you do?
We hurried.
To change? [Laughs]
No! [Laughs]
I even forgot my set of false teeth…
It’s okay. Don’t worry, please.
11:00

One should dress up to meet such a person…
You are dressed up. It’s all right.
All right.
Pretty fashionable.
Yes.
In case of firing, I’m ready to jump straight to the cellar.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Please don’t forget that children live here too, that people live here too.
… That people live here too. Definitely.
Hi.
Hi.
Come and visit us.
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11:36

Meeting with protesters against disengagement, 9:50 a.m.
May we?
Of course.
Great.
How are things in general?
Would you like some tea?
They shoot. Are you here to withdraw troops?
We are here to see people’s opinions. We saw what people say.
And what do they say?

12:00

That we should withdraw. People say it.
To us, all the time that we’ve been here, they have been saying the opposite.
We took such steps with withdrawal and disengagement before… And we paid
a very high price for it. Those who choose this way to the armistice,
trying to solve the problem quickly, usually get both disgrace and
further war. We see how Russia behaves: Abkhazia, Karabakh, and all
other relations… When we try to do it very fast, we limit ourselves in a
certain way.
How do you measure the quickness that you just mentioned? “When they
try to do it very fast.” I measure it like this: people die, every day
messages about wounded and killed appear. This is the time I use.
We may not solve everything, the whole story. Maybe. But we want
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to, at least we try to. Anyway, any war ends in any diplomacy. Any
war.
13:11

We understand that we are for Ukraine and we are about Ukraine, as you often
say. I don’t understand why we rush into these negotiations again, you
know…
We can forget about talking to anyone and just continue… and people will
continue to die.
We should talk but we should do it from our strong position.
We should talk?
Of course.
With whom?
With those who influence the process.
I don’t know. Say it openly for your sworn brothers: is Putin the one we
should talk with?
Putin too. But only from a strong position. We should be the ones to decide…
Cut the high-flown words, please. I ask: is Putin the one we should talk
with?
Of course, we should talk with him.
Hello. I live here…
So… Hello.
… and I would like to know if it’s the short or the long way. We here have been
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sitting in the cellar for five years.
Right, we were just asking the guys…
I live here.
14:00

No one has answers. Let’s imagine we are talking from scratch.
Are they shooting?
Right now one could say it’s like they are not shooting. It’s quieter, right.
It’s quiet, right?
And when I have bombs bursting here, then one could say they are shooting.
Let’s go and I will show you what my yard looks like.
Yeah…
You are just taking it wrong… Let me explain. You are just clutching at
the fact there is no shooting. Why are you picking on it? They live
here.
We are not advocating the long way, we are advocating the smart way.
They have been sitting here for five years. We want them to stop shooting. We
just want peace.
We need disengagement.
We know. We are aware of it.
Our life is jumping out of the cellar to the cellar, again and again. We have had
enough!
Guys. One by one. Goodbye.
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Goodbye.
Good luck.

But we didn’t come in.
Come in where?
We didn’t have a look at the weapon.
We can.
Is it there?
They said they have it under a bed.
15:00

Really?

Boys, look. Denis, we will again pass on to the conversation. Notice that I
haven’t come here with law-enforcement agencies. We haven’t
entered the house or anything… We are normal men.
So are we.
That’s what I am telling you, boys.
But wait, where are the locals? Are they saying that we… Are they afraid?
Boys, I… You want me to go there and show you the place or what?
No, here are the women…
The conversation is serious now. We are for honest, decent relations, right?
Of course.
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I am just telling you humanly. I have all the legislative rights.
So.
I am telling you now without any threats, telling humanly: boys, put away
your weapons. That is all I told you.
We don’t have any weapons. Where? Show me where I have weapon.
So you think that… You want me to enter your house and show you where
you don’t have it?
No, what does this have to do with…
I ask you now a serious question: do you want me to enter the house now
and show it?
What does this have to do with it? You say “put away”. Are we holding it now
or what?
I’m telling you once again, Denis, hear me.
I hear you.
These are serious things.
I understand…
I simply told you: put away the weapons. Do you hear me, boys?
One more thing. Yesterday there were protests in Ukraine and they wanted…
16:00

Where?
All across Ukraine, at 11 a.m. [16:04 inaudible]. We in Nikolaev have a sane
governor. He came out and took it to pass you a message about…
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Pass me the message now.
People who gathered for these actions want… not capitulation. They want to
have a constructive conversation… We all heard your promises about
the demilitarization and so on. We would like to discuss and formalize it
so it wouldn’t end like with Petro Oleksiyovych…
You want to formalize relations with me?
In a memorandum.
You and me?
Not me, all the people involved whom it hurts for Ukraine.
What capitulation? What are you talking about?
Formalization.
I came here to tell you to put away the weapons, and you shift it to me.
But I’m talking about another thing now. I heard you. I heard what you said.
Look, you cannot give me any ultimatums right now, Denis. You didn’t get
why I came here…
But I’m not giving you an ultimatum. I’m telling you that people…
Should we go in and take the weapons or what?
How is it connected? I’m telling you another thing…
I don’t understand where the conversation will end now. Boys.
17:00

We are having a normal conversation.
So let’s have it.
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No one is trying to dip you into anything. We just passed you what happened in
Ukraine.
Who passed? I’m telling you. Tell me who.
I’m saying: there were actions in Ukraine.
Denis, yesterday there was a rain in Ukraine — that’s what I heard.
I’m telling you about what happened.
Where? Who passed me what? I’m telling you, come on…
So I’m saying that people want to meet you.
What people?
People who went to the event at the Oblast Public Administration.
Can you tell me the surname or not?
If you want: Plehanov, Kuharchuk (these are from different oblasts),
Drozdov…
Denis, this is not how it’s done.
Well I was asked so I passed the messaged.
Wait. Did Stadnik came out to you?
Yes.
Our governor, Stadnik. So?
He gave a letter. Or did you give it to him?
To our president. For our president.
Let me read it, boys.
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But you asked me who was there and so I was telling what was in the letter.
You just asked me…
Denis, listen. I am the president of this country.
18:00

Of course.
I’m 41 years old. I’m not a dupe. I came here and told you: put away
weapons. So don’t change the topic to actions.
But what does it… We discussed it already and then you asked another thing…
I haven’t discussed it with you. I wanted to see some understanding in your
eyes. Instead, I see a guy who thinks I’m some kind of a goof. And
so you change the subject.
What subject… We had discussed it by then. I was talking about the next
thing…
No. Did I hear “okay” from you? Tell me “OK”.
But we don’t have weapons in our hands.
Which means you didn’t hear me.
Well, listen…
Guys, I was serious. Look, that’s it.
We heard you.
Letters… When I’m given letters, I view them. No problem. I always reply
to everything.
But we just said it to you and that’s all. What’s the difference?
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You said the letter was for me…
People passed the letter. You asked what it was about. So I was explaining.
So let them pass the letter.
I will read it.
As for the weapon in the house, we know about it. So listen…
Guys, look, we are tired of stopping objects. We are getting tired. Look,
there is democracy and there is the situation in the country. From
democracy to some serious illegal things… We were serious and we
wanted to talk humanly. Just put it away. Because you, guys, have
been at war. That is why we respect you.
19:18

And we respect the law and act according to law. We will act according to law,
neither more nor less.
Guys, I told you.
We have heard you.
Please. Goodbye, guys, good luck.
Have a nice day.
You too.

19:38

Zolote, meeting with locals, 10:45 a.m.
Greetings. Hello.
Vladimir… Hello.
Glad to see you.
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Yes. Stop the war. So that it’s quiet. So that they don’t shoot at nights like they
do…
We are for Ukraine and we only want to live in Ukraine. I only want to live in
Ukraine.
That’s right.
20:00

What did we do? They say on TV, on NewsOne that we are se…
“serapatists”…
You are not separatists.
And that we should be killed.
One man said that we are separatists. I said, “I will kill you for these words.” I
will serve my term in prison but I will kill you for these words.
No need to kill anyone…
Good day.
You are so young.
For now.
God grant. A child.
A child?
A grandchild.
All right.
Are you hear with good news?
With only good.
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Thank goodness.
So?
Well, increase the pension five-fold.
[Laugh]
I said “good news”, not “wonderful news”.
[Laugh]
And about the peace…
Peace, yes.
I know. It will happen. It should.
We trust you.
We want to go to bed and wake up without fear.
Will they withdraw?
21:00

You want it?
[Together] Yes! Of course!
All right. We will be doing it.
We want peace.
We want quiet.
Vladimir Aleksandrovich, you should withdraw them.
Could you tell please… We have children and grandchildren on the other side.
They have nowhere to go. The checkpoint is a very far journey. Please.
That is why we came here. Our side has opened the checkpoint. The other
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side hasn’t.
We know but…
Conversation is needed.
That side doesn’t have the same conditions as this one. We will talk about it.
I know but still…
There are no loaders, nothing.
I understand. We should come to an understanding.
When will the disengagement happen?
We are ready. Soon.
We are ready. Ready.
We are ready in general. I came here to make sure people want the
disengagement.
[Together] They want.
Because in Kiev, people organize demonstrations. They keep telling us they
want to protect you. From us.
No, we don’t need it.
22:00

That’s why we came. Our military men are doing well and they are ready.
We are ready for the disengagement.

Hi.
Good morning.
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Well done.
It’s great that they have coffee with milk, and the milk is from their own cows.
And is there just black coffee? Can I buy it?
Yes.
One coffee, please.
The shop has all the goods. People just don’t have money to buy it.
Sure.
And everything for children too.
We have a small and cozy shop.
Don’t listen to anyone. We just want peace. Disengagement and peace. That’s
all.
I see.
We have everything else.
When we have peace, come visit us for BBQ.
22:46

Examination of the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 12:30 p.m.
On behalf of the 72nd Brigade named for Chornykh Zaporozhtsiv and on my
own behalf I would like to give you our logo as a keepsake. Let it take a
worthy place whenever you decide to place it.

23:05

Thank you.
And rest assured that…
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Well, can’t wear it hear.
No, no, no, you need it.
It’s okay.
Fasten it.
You sure?
Absolutely.
Cool.
Awesome. Thank you.
Rest assured that we will fulfill all the arrangements and tasks.
You all are doing great. The main task is to save yourselves and members
of the armed forces. That’s the most important task.
Yes, sir!
Guys, thank you all. Take care. Thank you. Best of luck.
23:52

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine on October 27 the
illegal weapons that were in possession of protestants against the
disengagement were taken out from Zolote.
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Zelensky: Donbass People Need Elections
We agreed in Paris to confirm our devotion to a complete ceasefire. A corresponding
statement from the Trilateral Contact Group has been accepted on December 18, 2019. But we
have not been able to achieve total silence yet. Over almost the last two months, we recorded
more than 400 fires on Ukrainian positions that led to the death of Ukrainian people, Ukrainian
soldiers. We need effective mechanisms that would ensure a ceasefire not in words but in deeds.
You know, they try to convince us that such an effective mechanism is a direct dialog with the
so-called local authority in the Separate Districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. We are
ready for the dialog with locals from these territories but not with those who are not
acknowledged by the international law, [01:00] meaning that they cannot represent the local
population of Ukraine. Moreover, not once have I communicated with ordinary people from the
temporarily occupied territories. Objectively, the voice of Donbass is not only their voice. It's
also at least one and a half million people from Donetsk and Luhansk who were forced to leave
their homes. That is why we initiated the creation of a public dialog platform "Donbass World"
and they should be introduced to it. They should be introduced to discussions in Minsk and they
should take an active part in the discussion of their future in united, I insist on it, united Ukraine.
Our desire today is to conduct a local election on the whole territory of Ukraine,
including the Separate Districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, in October 2020. [02:00]
We wish we could conduct it in Crimea too. But doing so without basic safety and political
condition, breaking the Constitution of Ukraine and international standards of democratic
elections, is impossible. Especially when today, the Russian side openly — and it's true —
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informs the whole world that 125,000 Russian passports have been issued on the temporarily
uncontrolled Donbass territories in 2019.
I said it in Paris and I am repeating it: Donbass people need legitimate elections that will be
recognized by Ukraine and the whole world, and these elections cannot be legitimate if they are
conducted in breach of the Ukrainian legislation, to the sounds of firing, and with no control over
our boundaries.
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President Volodymyr Zelensky 2021 New Year’s Speech to All Ukrainians
V. Zelensky: [00:40] Dear Ukrainians! New Year is coming in a matter of minutes. It's time to
sum up, conclude, and talk about plans and goals...
[01:00] Boring? I agree! All right. I will speak clearly. And it makes sense since everything that
we do we do for you. We live in a great beautiful country, where there is everything. Incredible
nature, generous land, with smart and talented children, and where all presidents in their New
Year's greetings always say this phrase, "Dear Ukrainians, it was a difficult year..." You will ask
if 2020 was difficult. A little bit. [02:00] But not because of you. And not because of you. And
not because of all you. No.
So what was this year like? There were tears of pain. And tears of pride. There were things we
were ashamed of and things we were proud of. Things we'd like to forget. And things we will
never forget. There were those with whom we became even greater friends. Those with whom
we became strategic partners. Those with whom some forced us to quarrel but failed. Those who
always supported Ukraine and who still do. [03:00] Year 2020 reminded us of how many heroes
there really are among us.
In spring, we started to get sick. Turned out, hospitals and pharmacies lacked so many things.
Why? Some people lost their scent long before COVID. And so we all were like in the movies
when it seems that only superheroes can save us. Adults don't believe they exist. But this year,
as in 2014, we realized once again: superheroes do exist. And our medics. Our supermedics.
Super laboratory assistants. Superdrivers of ambulance. Superpilots. Super border guards.
[04:00] Superteachers. Our superfirefighters and superrescuers. All of them joined our soldiers
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and became superheroes. And we definitely have no choice but to be super Ukraine. Right?
Right!
Yes, it was a year when, unfortunately, cataclysms destroyed housing and nature. A year when,
fortunately, we destroyed stereotypes. For example, that it is impossible to make good roads in
Ukraine. This myth could go wherever it liked on 4,000 km of new roads. Someday, you will be
18 and you will be able to drive cars on Ukrainian roads. We tried to make sure that these roads
won’t get old and tired by the time you grow up. [05:00] This year proved that the Okhmatdyt
Children's Hospital can be fully completed and not handed over like a mace to each next
president of Ukraine. It proved that we could demolish a monument to corruption, set up as far
back as 2004, and could turn the legendary long-delayed construction of the country into a new
bridge in Zaporizhzhia in just eight months. And build 150 bridges all over Ukraine. And we
don't listen to those who provoke scandals on social networks. Some people choose to write
about glitches, while others choose to build bridges.
This year has shown that it is possible to make modern checkpoints for people from Donbas and
Crimea where they can see once and for all who treats them as people, [06:00] and who as
hostages. This year has shown that we can talk about the army, or we can make for security and
defense the largest budget in history. It has shown that the state can start the common
construction of corvettes and for the first time since Ukraine's independence order three new
Ukrainian planes from the Antonov company. It has shown that interest rates for business loans
can be smaller than 20, 18, or 14% — just like you: 5%. 7%. Or 9%. Who is 9? And the interest
rates can be like you. Are you 7? And you 6?
Kid: And I'm 5!
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V. Zelensky: All right!
2020 has proven once again that Ukraine does not leave its people. We don't care where to bring
them back from: from basements in Donbas, a Russian prison [07:00] or Wuhan in China.
Captured sailors of a tanker from Libya or the deceased crew and passengers of the plane from
Iran. And we are equally happy to bring back 250,000 citizens who got trapped around the whole
world due to quarantine or one Ukrainian. Our defender. The undefeated Vitaly Markiv. Have
you heard of him? He told himself these words, "I will get through. I will get back." So that he
and his beloved one would have a boy like you. Or a girl like you. Or better — both a boy and a
girl.
This year has repeatedly raised the Ukrainian flag. We became the first in swimming, boxing,
sports and rhythmic gymnastics, athletics [08:00], wrestling, cycling, and even checkers. And
when you argue over who is stronger — Batman, Wolverine or Deadpool... Wolverine? Batman?
Deadpool? Actually, the strongest one is Ukrainian, our bogatyr Oleksiy Novikov, who this year
became the strongest man on Earth. And we have no choice but to become the strongest Ukraine.
And most importantly, this year reminded us what silence is. The words "there was no shooting
today". The days when they say in the news, "There were no casualties today." The weeks when
mothers, wives, and children don't cry. The months when our soldiers [09:00] don't die. 158 days
of a ceasefire in Donbas. It is the longest since the beginning of the war. 158 days of the
armistice. Was it perfect? No, it's true. But does it make it unnecessary? Not at all. And this is
also true.
You know, you are still very young and you may not fully understand why this is happening. But
now you have to know one thing for sure: Ukrainian defenders are the best in the world. They
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are brave and very, very strong. But, unfortunately, it so happens that God takes some of them to
heaven. The best and the bravest of them. [10:00] This year, we tried so hard so that God would
leave as many of them as possible in Ukraine. So they could continue to protect us and bring to
us peace. Peace is possible. It is close. It is sure to come.
You know, all the presidents in New Year's address say one phrase, "Dear Ukrainians, it was a
difficult year... But the next one will be better." And with that, I agree. It will be better! For you.
For you. For you. And for all our Ukraine. And whatever it is, let's thank 2020 and not scold it.
[11:00]
Yes, unfortunately, it took away Paton from Kyiv, Zhvanetsky from Odesa, Skoryk and Viktiuk
from Lviv. But it granted us almost 300,000 new citizens, boys and girls born in Ukraine this
year. Let's turn off our adult pragmatism for their sake and think of something very bold, close to
fantastic, for Ukraine. Yes, just like our children can do it. [10:33]
[Children speaking]
[12:25] This is what our children want. And we? We have to fulfill it.
Dear Ukrainians, next year we will celebrate 30 years of our independence. We are a great
nation. We have the courage of Svyatoslav, the greatness of Volodymyr, the wisdom of
Yaroslav. We have Shevchenko. Moreover, we have two Shevchenkos. And being a president of
such a wonderful nation is a great pride. And an enormous responsibility. [13:00] And I will do
everything so that in a year and in all the upcoming years on the same day and time I would not
be ashamed to look you in the eye.
I don’t want to say that peace will come to Ukraine while I stand on Bankova Street in Kyiv. I
want to say that peace has come to Ukraine while I stand on Artema street in Donetsk. And I
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want to write "Crimea is Ukraine" not on the internet but on a sandy beach in Yalta. On the
Ukrainian sand of the Ukrainian beach of the Ukrainian Yalta. I know that Donetsk, Luhansk and
Crimea now live in a different time in all senses. And it's been almost an hour since you were
told on TV that the New Year has come. But I know it's been almost an hour since you've been
waiting for us to celebrate the New Year together. As one family. [14:00] As one nation. As one
country. So, Donbas and Crimea! Turn the clock back. Be with us! Are you ready? So are we. I
sincerely wish all Ukrainians a Happy New Year! May everyone be healthy. May everyone be
happy. May this happen in 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 4, 3, 2… Happy New Year, Ukraine!
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Andriy Bohdan on Steinmeier's Formula, Kolomoyskyi's Influence and Meeting with Trump /
1/2
The words of Andriy Bohdan below are in bold, while those of the interviewer are in
normal print.
Hello.
Hello.
Thank you for agreeing to meet with us today. I'll start by listing a few epithets that
journalists use at the beginning of an interview with you: Kolomoyskyi's lawyer, the head
of the President's Office, the power behind the throne, a lover of some parties. How do you
see yourself? What would you like to say to people who don't know who Andriy Bohdan is,
given all the epithets I have just listed?
I think I am a cheerful and sincere person. My end in itself is not power or money. My end in
itself is achieving a certain result [01:00] and comfort of the situation I am in. These are the key
messages.
Actually, you are, let's be honest, one of the most odious representatives of Zelensky's team.
Why odious? Well-known.
Taking into account the media image that you too have created...
I don't really understand what we mean by the media image.
The truth is, I am Kolomoyskyi's lawyer indeed, I do love parties, I always go to some
nightclubs, restaurants, and night spots. I lead an open lifestyle and I try to appear there without
guards.
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And when I was coming here, I warned that I would do it because it is a part of my life and it
does not contradict any laws or any public ethics. I don't understand why I have to give it up.
What about the power behind the throne?
Why the power behind the throne? We have the president. My position means ensuring his
activities [02:00]. I don't have power authority as a person. The head of the President's Office or
the head of the Presidential Administration is not provided as a public administration body by
legislation or the Constitution.

And yet this post is very important in the government system. Only a trusted person can
get this position.
I can't agree with you. Not always. It depends on the person as with any position. The
importance of any position is determined by the number of functional authorities a person of this
position has.
We mentioned the Kolomoyskyi's lawyer, the power behind the throne, a party lover — all
this is clear. But you also add fuel to the fire. [03:00] I mean your Facebook answers, for
example. You know how to troll. Why do you do it? Do you like being a bad guy?
No, I'm not trying to be bad. I'm just having fun and joking in such a way. This is how I troll
people.
But not everybody gets it. Sometimes people get offended. Especially with you being in
public authority.
What people? I don't offend anyone personally.
Vitali Klitschko probably doesn't think so.
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This is my worldview and my thoughts. Why should I limit myself and tell lies or not tell what I
think?
I am a free person. I express my thoughts and I will continue to do so. If somebody doesn't like
it, they have the right.
It also matters how exactly you do it. Sometimes you choose such words that may offend
people.
I don't understand which cases you are talking about. I don't offend people.
Well, by calling them Poroshenko's bots or...
Is "Poroshenko's bots" an insult?
Well, I don't know. It can be for someone.
Well, I identify [04:00] people who, contrary to common sense (this is my point of view)…
Maybe, they call each other Poroshenko's bots and put some positive meaning into it.
But do you realize that all of this is a part of your negative image too?
I don't know. Positive or negative — I know that people are valued by the results of their actions.
If they reach some results, positive for the society, I consider them to be good people. But if you
try to justify yourself and argue with everybody all the time, you will accomplish nothing. You'll
just engage in empty talk.
We had different heads of Office of the President or the Presidential Administration:
Dmytro Tabachnyk [05:00], Boris Lozhkin, Serhiy Lyovochkin, and each of them had his
own style of administration. How would you describe your administration style?
Each of them... And there were also many more. For example, Viktor Baloha.
Who is the closest to you in terms of the style? No one?
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I don't know. No one. I have my personal administration style, my personal style of achieving
goals and an understanding of these goals.
The main point of my work, as I see it and what I try to do in our team, is to synchronize the
work of various public administration bodies: ministries, the Cabinet of Ministers, the
Verkhovna Rada.
Why synchronizing?
First of all, because there are a lot of young people who have no experience in public
administration, service, and work in such positions [06:00]. It is difficult for them to understand
each other and to reach these compromises.
Plus, there is a certain misunderstanding of these processes that exist in the state. The processes
of decision making and processes of acceleration in decision making.
Therefore, this is my job, as I see it for myself, and this is the task set for me by the President: to
explain how it works and to explain to them the shortest way from an idea to an executed
decision.
Sometimes it's hard and can be perceived in the wrong way by someone, but these are the tasks I
set for myself. As for the people you mentioned, none of them was in a similar situation.
What do you mean by a similar situation?
I mean a complete restart of the government at the top level with the completely new Verkhovna
Rada, one faction [07:00] that creates the monomajority, the completely new Cabinet of
Ministers, the completely new Office of the President, the completely new ministries. This is
unique.
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In the past, it was the relocation of people from one position to another, without changing neither
the work direction nor the work methods. With us, everything has changed dramatically.
In just a year.
Not yet a year. I'd say in half a year.
A year has passed since the beginning of the election campaign in which you played one of
the most important roles. You talked about this earlier in the interview. I talked to those
around you and found out that you were the person who persuaded Volodymyr Zelensky to
be a candidate in the presidential election.
And this campaign, which you built with the help of other people, was very high quality
and fast [08:00]. Probably, it has gone down in history, including in the politicaltechnological history of Ukraine, in terms of its effectiveness.
I believe that it has down in the world history.
73% of people voted for Volodymyr Zelensky in the second round. Now when so much time
has passed and you have been in power since May, can you tell me if there is a difference
between how to run a very fast and high-quality election campaign and how to run a
country?
Well, of course, there is a difference. These are two completely different things. I'd like to
explain so that our audience understands. As far as I understand, Volodymyr Zelensky had long
wanted to take part in the election campaign and to make the TV story from the Servant of the
People movie a reality. He wanted at least to try [09:00].
How did we start working together? First of all, we had known each other for long before this
situation and these talks took place. For 15 years I had been participating in all the elections that
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took place in Ukraine, in completely different campaigns of completely different politicians, in
completely different positions, fields, and parts of the election campaign.
I know political science, sociology, jurisprudence, election economics, different levels, different
stages, communications between them, and public communications. Probably, I was the kind of
person who knew the real answers to a lot of the questions that were in his mind. Moreover, I
could implement these answers.
By the way, I'd like to note that many of my ideas turned out to be wrong. They were corrected
by [10:00] the team and by Volodymyr Zelensky. And it was the symbiosis of experience and
creativity that gave this result.
Is the current situation different from the campaign? No, it's not. The dynamics of work do not
differ. You might have noticed that we do not stop even for a second. We keep going forward
fast. Of course, there are people who are left behind. People who don't like our speed, decisions,
and success are left behind.
Are you sure that quick decisions are always best?
I am only sure about things that sociology tells us. And sociology tells us that the citizens of
Ukraine are tired of endless conversation with no action.
People wanted actions, quick actions. Maybe, they didn't always realize what the actions were,
and they didn't always agree with them, but the main message was to do anything. Carry out
reforms. Don't turn into those endless conversations with no actions. [11:00]
But does anyone in Zelensky's team consider the consequences of these quick decisions?
Does anyone know how to analyze the consequences of quick decisions?
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From the scientific point of view, all these decisions and all these laws that we pass have long
been analyzed. Their mathematical and economic model has long been understood. But no one
knows how it will work in Ukraine, in this situation where we are now. This is more intuitive.
We can recruit an infinite number of experts who will speak sensible things, but we will not see
the future from the present. So yes, there are risks, but these risks are minimized.
The biggest and worst risk for Ukraine and the society is no changes again. It will definitely be
the worst situation [12:00] if we do nothing. If there are mistakes, we believe that the people will
forgive us for some mistakes, that Ukraine will forgive us. If there is any movement forward.
But the price for these mistakes can be very high. Do you realize it?
Yes, we do.
Let's take that story with the exchange of captives, for example. Of course, it was a very
positive story. Our country had long waited for it. Everyone was happy indeed that it
happened. But in a hurry, no one realized the actual price of what happened and why this
exchange took place.
Many people now believe that the Steinmeier's formula and all these processes are
connected with the exchange of prisoners. It also applies to the sailors: they didn't have to
agree to the exchange because Russia simply had to enforce the international court
decision. [13:00] And we had to force Russia to do it. Don't you think that in this situation
we might have lost something to get quick results? Might have lost some international
positions?
No, I don't think like that at all. Again, we can talk endlessly. But now we see the result, and a
vast majority of the citizens of Ukraine support this result. What have we lost?
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I believe that there is no connection between the Steinmeier's formula and the realization of the
exchange yet. It was a mutual step forward. I do not know if there will be a second step. But we
hope there will be.
We lost absolutely nothing by exchanging captives. We only showed the adequacy of the
leadership. We united Ukraine [14:00] around this idea and released our citizens nevertheless.
And it is very important that our soldiers see that they are not abandoned in captivity if
something happens. The state will fight to the last to release them. It is a powerful message.
With the Steinmeier's formula, there is a movement towards peace. We show it publicly both to
Ukraine and to other countries.
And the opposite side, Russia, needs to respond somehow because the position "I hear nothing, I
see nothing" is not understood by society, even in Russia. In general, it is necessary to
understand that our vigorous actions and our peaceful position are intended not only for the
international environment. It is intended for the citizens of Russia. [15:00]
There was the court decision, and Russia had to execute it? It had to and yet it didn't. And it
would never do. We can talk to a professional lawyer for ages but absolutely nothing will
change. For that to change, we need to switch to the mentality of the Russians.
Because of their mass media, they are very hostile to Ukraine. They consider us some negative
nation, nationalists. And in the open position, we want to step forward and we do. But the
Russian leadership opposes, having no reasons to explain why. Thus, people from that side will
start asking questions, "Why are we behaving so inappropriately?"
It may seem a trifle, but the Afghanistan war didn't end because [16:00] of the problems at the
international level. It ended because a lot of social movements appeared inside the USSR. And
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the leadership then decided that it was better to withdraw troops and stop the war so as not to
disturb their society.
Nevertheless, we can, of course, create this image for the Russians to show our peaceful
intends. But you mentioned the sociological data, and they showed that after the
Steinmeier's formula, the president's rating was reduced by 7 percent. Many sociologists
said this is, among others, due to the lack of communication about the Steinmeier's
formula. And also due to this negative rhetoric that was heard from you or from Davyd
Arakhamia, accusing people who went to non-capitulation public meetings. [17:00]
First of all, no one understands what the Steinmeier's formula is in the first place and that it has
to be documented during a corresponding meeting, and that corresponding agreements have to be
documented in the law of Ukraine.
This is a certain fiction of the name that doesn't have a full essence now.
Those people who went to the public meetings... First of all, I said in my post that we have
information that one of the political leaders, namely the previous president, is taking all possible
measures to increase his role in the protest movement.
And it's not that surprising. Everyone knows it. The people who were present in the center of
Kyiv know it. And it was they who said that Petro Oleksiyovych was a part of this movement
that supported him and actively tried to make him a leader. [18:00] Other participants of the
movement didn't agree with that. No need to confuse it. I was only talking about one part of the
movement and one person.
As for the sociological data... We understand sociology very well and we don't do anything until
we give it a try. Until we understand how our society will receive it.
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It was not the Steinmeier's formula that received such negative and a reduction in ratings, but it
was just an understandable process: due to the release of the captives, there was a huge increase
in the rating. It was situational. It could not stay long at 73 percent.
Therefore, this is a usual period when the rating begins to reduce a little over time. But it
reduces, not falls. There can be many factors: the speed of passing laws, various debatable laws,
the land reform, and the Steinmeier's formula didn't change [19:00] the society's attitude to the
president at all.
Let's go back to the election campaign that you, naturally, had a great influence on. Do you
remember that Volodymyr Zelensky's rhetoric as a candidate, among other things, was
about not dividing the Ukrainians and the society?
But, taking into account the words about the "Poroshenko's bots", about people who
participated in meetings for money, as well as the statements of Davyd Arakhamia or other
deputies of the Servant of the People, doesn't it seem to contradict that rhetoric about not
dividing the society? Don't you think that you polarize and aggravate the situation too?
No, I don't think like that at all. Not polarizing the society means not discussing issues that
divide the society [20:00] and not putting on the agenda issues that are not received by the
society. But I think we are obliged to call things as they are. We are obliged to say what we think
and what we know.
Sometimes you can make mistakes or generalize things.
I didn't generalize. I don't know, maybe, I have offended you personally somehow. Maybe, you
went to Maidan looking for answers about the Steinmeier's formula. I understand that many
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people came out there at the call of the heart. But some people wanted to dominate, and for this
purpose, they used certain not quite ethical possibilities.
Well, we will return to the former president later. Another slogan during the campaign was
about "changing the system". And I wonder how does it comply, firstly, with Avakov
[21:00] still being the Minister of Internal Affairs? In this regard, some say that he ensured
the election results or that the elections were transparent thanks to him.
And the second thing is your trip to Andriy Dovbenko's wedding. I don't want to ask about
its attributes or its place so as not to be a hypocrite. But you understand that the problem is
not about where it was, but...
Please say the question because I can't write it all down...
... about where and to whose wedding you went. Because everyone knows Andriy
Dovbenko. As a highly professional lawyer, you definitely knew that he was a so-called
enforcer of the Ministry of Justice. How did it happen that Avakov is still there and that
you can come and communicate with...?
Look. Avakov is a professional [22:00] who ensured fair elections. Maybe, this would be the
right political move to change absolutely everyone and change Avakov, and society would like
it, but it would be unfair.
He worked to achieve a legal and fair result and he ensured this result. And if it is profitable for
you to do something, but your conscience does not allow you to do it, it is better to make a
decision according to your conscience. We gave him the carte blanche of the new term of office
during which he has to win the sympathy of society. Or fail to win it.
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But as a corporate lawyer you can't help but know that Arsen Avakov was one of the
pillars of the system that existed in the country for five years, [23:00] can you? He was
among the so-called Strategic Nine.
As for the Strategic Nine, I don't know. All I know is that he had a deep conflict with the former
president. And I know that he minimized the negative influence of many law enforcement
agencies during the election campaign. Honestly, if it were not for Arsen Avakov, these elections
would not have taken place in the way they did.
My colleague Yulia Mostova called him "not the first, but also not the second person in the
country," and Mikheil Saakashvili said that Poroshenko and Avakov divided the country
between themselves and did the same with the financial flows. It is a bit strange to leave
this person as a minister, given the declaration of the intent to completely renew the
system.
In our system, Avakov has absolutely no relation to any financial flows, to any schemes, to any
situations that can promote a negative. To none at all. [24:00]
If anything like this happens in reality, I think that the president, parliament, Cabinet of
Ministers, and I will react to it immediately.
Now, the power is completely restarted. And we do not see, in any case, I don't see, even you —
you don't see in the public space examples that Arsen Avakov is a part of some negative events,
corruption, or something else.
Yes, for now. But some questions may arise as to the appointments...
Look, for 27 years, everyone in this country has been a part of some teams. Absolutely all:
politicians, managers, business managers.
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If we judge each person not by their professional skills but by their connection to any team, no
matter if they did something negative or not, then we will have no one to hold these positions
and manage.
And even the new spotless ministers [25:00], as we found out when we met them and talked to
them, worked at different times as businessmen in various teams, as experts in various situations,
in various political backgrounds.
A person has to prove themselves. If he works honestly and openly, benefiting the state, then
Arsen Avakov will be a good Minister of Internal Affairs.
If he doesn't follow the rules that we declare for ourselves, then he won't be the Minister of
Internal Affairs.
As for Andriy Dovbenko, it's a very strange story. Ania Ogrenchuk (his wife) and I have known
each other for more than 12 years. I've known her for ages. And Ania Ogrenchuk is one of the
leaders of the legal market in her segment. Just like Andriy Dovbenko is one of the leaders of the
legal services market.
Since I was a lawyer too, we met a lot during these years [26:00] in this market. As for him
being an "enforcer" of the Ministry of Justice... Well, excuse me, I was called names too, but
neither today nor during this period has anyone made any official suspicions or accusations
against him. And the agreement about this wedding was made a year ago. Approximately in
October last year.
But a lot has changed since then, and I think it's a matter of choice.
If we meet old friends only when it is beneficial to us or the position allows us, well, it, of
course, negatively characterizes us.
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So personal relationships are more important to you?
Yes, personal relationships are very important to me. [27:00] Because in this state, I was a part
of very different teams, both business and political, and I was a lawyer.
I want to tell you that regardless of the party symbols, the average percentage of bad and good
people does not depend on the name of the party and does not depend on people's birthplace, be
it Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, or Donetsk.
And what is this percentage in the current team?
The best in the history of Ukraine.
You say that so confidently, right?
Yes, I am absolutely confident.
But have you already figured out the number of bad people, including people in the
Servant of the People? [28:00]
You know, I don't know any bad people there. I do have several "favorites", people who, I think,
have some mental disorders. I mean they are not driven by some negative thoughts and they don't
want to steal anything. They just want to be noticed, they want some kind of fame.
They have a lot of energy...
Recently, I asked one person, who was related to you or worked with you, who the center of
the state power is now. He reflected on it for some time but couldn't give an answer. Do you
know who the center of the state power is and who basically the state power is? Who
controls the country now? How much control does the president have?
I believe that the country is governed by civil society. [29:00] I really do. I can explain.
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The president is the one making decisions in the country. The vast majority of decisions. These
decisions are emotional, intuitive, and sometimes they are not as deeply philosophic and are not
the decisions that a professional diplomat or a professional manager would make.
These decisions always, in my opinion, aim at developing the country and improving the lives of
the citizens of Ukraine. And we, people around the president, try to make these decisions a
reality and achieve results. Here, everyone has their own effectiveness. [30:00]
Are you confident in President Zelensky's entourage that now basically shapes these
decisions?
I was around many great people. Each entourage has its own efficiency. As with any
environment, there are stronger and weaker people.
But in our team (this is my opinion and I believe and I am sure that it's true), there are no people
who want to earn money by foul means, there are no people who wish wrong to the country,
there are no people who are ready to exchange their conscience for some fleeting joys.
We are talking now more about the values. What about professionalism? A lot of the
people had no practical experience. [31:00]
You know, I don't like talking about it. My BBC interview was deep and meaningful but no one
watched it. Everyone only watched about...
...mentally ill...
...about mentally ill deputies. But again, we need to understand the professional skills of our
journalism and their honesty.
Because when asked about our deputies, I talked for half an hour about their great personalities
and excellent professional skills. These people's intelligence and professional training are much
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higher than those of all the previous compositions of the Verkhovna Rada. They are not
demagogues, populists, or politicians.
They are people who deeply understand their professional subject. Answering the question if
they are all so good, no, not all of them are so good. Of course, sometimes there are negative
displays. [32:00] But they are exceptions.
Can you explain what you meant about the civil society that governs Ukraine?
Volodymyr Oleksandrovych is very sensitive to the opinions of civil society. He reads a lot,
including social media.
Maybe, it'd be better to read less. Unfortunately, his predecessor did the same...
I'm constantly saying this. It's a certain correlation: if you don't read it, you don't understand
what is going on and you don't hear these critical signals. But if you read, you sometimes
become dependent on that narrow circle of people.
It's called a filter bubble.
Yes, a filter bubble. So no, it's not critical. Why? Because this is not the only information
channel. It's just one of them. If one of the channels [33:00] begins to prevail over the others, it
will lead to an information bath, in which all Ukrainian presidents eventually found themselves.
And my task, among others, is to ensure that the president receives versatile information, critical
to various opinions, to various thoughts, to various events. And he as an honest and emotional
person will make the decisions.
In the summer, you appeared with the president very often. Because of this, talks about the
power behind the throne actually started. Now, you appear in public with the president
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much more rarely. You were not present at the press conference. Why? Is it your choice or
the president's choice?
I was present at the press conference.
You were not present near the president and no one prompted him.
If being objective, of course, I tried to be near during the first trips and the first appearances after
the inauguration [34:00] to advise at some point, to suggest a correct move to solve a problem.
Because sometimes even I don't know the names of some state bodies, and you also have to
understand their powers and their interaction.
Today, first of all, there is no need for me to be present in the circle of the president: he himself
very quickly understands everything, reacts, and makes decisions.
Secondly, there is already such controllability in the state that implies that someone from a small
circle of people is constantly present here on Bankova Street. For example, I can leave when the
president or the team are here but I'll try to be present when the president has gone somewhere.
[35:00]
Why were you not present at the meeting with Trump?
Meeting with Trump? Honestly, I don't know. Volodymyr Oleksandrovych told me that I
probably shouldn't go there.
Is it connected with the negative attitude towards you during the appointment to the
position of the head?
Maybe, it is.
Then I have a question about Trumpgate in which Ukraine was involved. A very
interesting story. I know that Giuliani's lawyer tried to contact you through his people
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during the inauguration and arrange a meeting with the president. And you allegedly
refused. Is it true? Neither you nor the president met with them.
These are two different cases. You are presenting them as one. [36:00] Indeed, all the
acquaintances and friends said that these two lawyers who worked for Giuliani wanted to meet
us. Various people recommended them as very influential.
Well, I am a lawyer too, so I understand the status of certain individuals. Thus, we decided that
we don't meet with any persons who don't have official status.
This is the right position.
Since December last year, we have followed this rule, although sometimes the requirements to
meet were very critical. Neither Volodymyr Zelensky nor I have met with any of them.
As for Giuliani's trip... when a Giuliani’s Tweet was posted saying that "I won't go to Ukraine
because people in this Ukraine are so mean", [37:00] we simply didn't plan to meet with him.
There were no arrangements and we didn't even know he was coming. Something happened to
him, honestly, I don't know.
Numerous testimonies now suggest that these meetings took place in Madrid. President
Zelensky's assistant Andriy Yermak met Giuliani and his lawyers. He is an official
representative, and yet he meets Parnas and Fruman as well as Giuliani. Why did it
happen?
It is hard to say for sure. I did not take part in making decisions about Andriy Yermak's trip and
meeting. I don't know what they talked about there. I don't know what they discussed.
Apparently, if this meeting took place, it was Andriy's decision, [38:00] as he is a non-staff
assistant, and it lets him hold such meetings that do not have an official color.
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I heard different characteristics of Andriy Yermak. The most neutral one stated that this
person looked like a criminal problem solver. And yet, this man is now in charge of
international relations on behalf of the Office of the President. In many cases, people I
talked to and people I heard said that he behaves like a bull in a china shop, even though
diplomacy and international relations are delicate work.
I don't know. You heard a lot about me too, but I'm a normal person.
Do you consider him an effective member of the team?
Yes, I consider him an effective member of the team.
It is difficult for me to estimate his professionalism, his knowledge, [39:00] and his
traditionalism, but he is definitely an effective member of our team. Because the release of the
Russian captives and sailors is part of the work he did.
Plus, you need to understand what classical diplomacy is. This is a high science of how to reply
to a simple question for four hours and not give any answer. When professional diplomats speak,
there is no need to waste time. Basically, an ordinary person can't understand and estimate it.
Therefore, maybe, we should look for simple answers to complex questions. Maybe, this is the
member of the team who can cut Gordian's knot.
Can there be simple answers, given the very difficult situation in the international history
of Ukraine? [40:00] There are European partners and there is Russia. The European
partners want some prompt reconciliation with Russia. There is also the USA. And you
have to balance somehow in his triangle.
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We have to balance and we definitely have a huge team of professional diplomats. Still, the
policy of the state is determined by professional diplomats. They take part in official meetings
and negotiations.
You need to understand that any negotiations have a formal and informal component. A decision
is not made by one person or one group of people. Each decision is discussed in a professional
environment. Yes, probably there are no simple solutions. But in any case, we have to move
forward and make decisions [41:00], sorting out this mass tumble gradually.
At least, Ukraine is no longer an object, but a subject of the world's external policy.
It's just not clear whether it's good or bad. Could you tell me if it's true that you have
abstracted from the PrivatBank issue on the part of the state, and Andriy Yermak is also
dealing with this issue now?
I haven't heard that Yermak is engaged in it. I can't even imagine what role he may have in this
issue. As for me, yes, I have dissociated myself from information flows and I am not involved in
any decision-making concerning PrivatBank.
And when was the last time you communicated with your former client? I mean Ihor
Kolomoyskyi.
Well, I communicate with him from time to time.
Is it true that Andriy Bohdan has a rather tense relationship with him, taking into account
that not everything happens in a way that Ihor Kolomoyskyi would like it to happen?
[42:00]
I cannot say if it's tense or not.
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Yes, we do have different views on different events that take place in the parliament, for
example. Sometimes we share our views. But in any case, it's not Kolomoisky who determines
the policy of Ukraine, but it's Volodymyr Zelensky.
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